Lemur: Server-Side Request Forgery via the ACME client following server-controlled URLs

SummaryThe ACME client used to issue certificates from Let's Encrypt / Google Public CA / private ACME CAs connects to an acmeurl, then issues requests to URLs that the ACME server returns in its directory/order/authorization/finalize responses - this is the classic ACME-client SSRF RFC 8555...

devpi-server may leak database contents

ImpactIf the replication protocol is enabled by using the primary or deprecated master role for a server instance, then the +changelog URL route can be used to read the complete database content including password hashes, and the ids and salts of tokens from devpi-tokens by using a trivially...

PYSEC-2026-3676 Lemur: SSRF protection in certificate revocation checking bypassable via HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding (incomplete fix for GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95)

Summary The SSRF mitigation added for GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95 validaterevocationurl in lemur /certificates/verify.py can be bypassed. An operator-role user who uploads a certificate with attacker-controlled CRL/OCSP extensions can still make Lemur reach internal destinations RFC1918, loopback,...

PYSEC-2026-3677 Lemur: Sub-CA creation never checks `AuthorityPermission` on the parent authority

Summary Repo under test: https://github.com/Netflix/lemur When ADMINONLYAUTHORITYCREATION=False an explicitly supported and documented configuration, POST /api/1/authorities with type=subca never verifies that the caller holds AuthorityPermission on the supplied parent authority. The parent field...

Lemur: Sub-CA creation never checks `AuthorityPermission` on the parent authority

SummaryRepo under test: https://github.com/Netflix/lemurWhen ADMINONLYAUTHORITYCREATION=False an explicitly supported and documented configuration, POST /api/1/authorities with type=subca never verifies that the caller holds AuthorityPermission on the supplied parent authority. The parent field i...

Lemur: Incomplete fix for GHSA-v2wp-frmc-5q3v -- ACME authority update endpoint allows non-admin to replace `acme_url` with internal IP, bypassing allowlist

SummaryThe fix for GHSA-v2wp-frmc-5q3v added validateacmeurl to reject acmeurl values not in ACMEDIRECTORYHOSTALLOWLIST, but the validation is only called at authority creation time POST. The authority update endpoint PUT /api/1/authorities/ accepts and stores arbitrary options -- including a...

PYSEC-2026-3661 devpi-server may leak database contents

Impact If the replication protocol is enabled by using the primary or deprecated master role for a server instance, then the +changelog URL route can be used to read the complete database content including password hashes, and the ids and salts of tokens from devpi-tokens by using a trivially...

sqlparse: TokenList.__init__ materializes O(subtree) value per group, causing CPU DoS before depth/token caps trigger

Summarysqlparse ships hard limits MAXGROUPINGDEPTH=100, MAXGROUPINGTOKENS=10000 intended to bound parsing work on attacker-supplied SQL, but the path that reaches those limits is itself Ondepth per token-group construction. A 1-2 KB SQL payload e.g. SELECT 1 ... with 500-2000 nesting levels, or a...

PYSEC-2026-3698 sqlparse: Inefficient Regex Handling of Dollar-Quoted SQL Literals Leads to ReDoS (Denial of Service)

Summary sqlparse contains a Regular Expression Denial of Service ReDoS vulnerability in its dollar-quoted SQL literal lexer. The regex pattern at sqlparse/keywords.py:33 uses a backreference \1 to match closing dollar-quote delimiters, causing On² CPU complexity when processing inputs containing...

PYSEC-2026-3662 GeoLens: Cross-dataset authorization bypass discloses private dataset metadata, schema, sample values, table rows, and raster/vector tile data

Summary Multiple GeoLens read/link endpoints authorized only the resource named in the request URL a map, a VRT, a source dataset, an AI request and failed to re-authorize a second, caller-influenced dataset that the request reached through a relationship, layer reference, mosaic source, or reque...

PYSEC-2026-3663 GeoLens: Cross-dataset authorization bypass discloses private dataset metadata, schema, sample values, table rows, and raster/vector tile data

Summary Multiple GeoLens read/link endpoints authorized only the resource named in the request URL a map, a VRT, a source dataset, an AI request and failed to re-authorize a second, caller-influenced dataset that the request reached through a relationship, layer reference, mosaic source, or reque...

PYSEC-2026-3699 sqlparse: TokenList.__init__ materializes O(subtree) value per group, causing CPU DoS before depth/token caps trigger

Summary sqlparse ships hard limits MAXGROUPINGDEPTH=100, MAXGROUPINGTOKENS=10000 intended to bound parsing work on attacker-supplied SQL, but the path that reaches those limits is itself Ondepth per token-group construction. A 1-2 KB SQL payload e.g. SELECT 1 ... with 500-2000 nesting levels, or ...

PYSEC-2026-3687 MLflow: Unauthenticated full-read SSRF in webhook delivery: _validate_webhook_url bypassed via unvalidated HTTP redirects (and DNS rebinding)

Summary The default MLflow Tracking Server mlflow server, no authentication, default SQLite backend exposes the model-registry webhooks API unauthenticated, including a synchronous POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/id/test endpoint that returns the upstream response status and body to the caller. The...

GeoLens: Cross-dataset authorization bypass discloses private dataset metadata, schema, sample values, table rows, and raster/vector tile data

SummaryMultiple GeoLens read/link endpoints authorized only the resource named in therequest URL a map, a VRT, a source dataset, an AI request and failed tore-authorize a second, caller-influenced dataset that the request reachedthrough a relationship, layer reference, mosaic source, or request...

MLflow: Unauthenticated full-read SSRF in webhook delivery: _validate_webhook_url bypassed via unvalidated HTTP redirects (and DNS rebinding)

SummaryThe default MLflow Tracking Server mlflow server, no authentication, default SQLite backend exposes the model-registry webhooks API unauthenticated, including a synchronous POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/id/test endpoint that returns the upstream response status and body to the caller. The...

GeoLens: Cross-dataset authorization bypass discloses private dataset metadata, schema, sample values, table rows, and raster/vector tile data

SummaryMultiple GeoLens read/link endpoints authorized only the resource named in therequest URL a map, a VRT, a source dataset, an AI request and failed tore-authorize a second, caller-influenced dataset that the request reachedthrough a relationship, layer reference, mosaic source, or request...

sqlparse: Inefficient Regex Handling of Dollar-Quoted SQL Literals Leads to ReDoS (Denial of Service)

Summarysqlparse contains a Regular Expression Denial of Service ReDoS vulnerability in its dollar-quoted SQL literal lexer. The regex pattern at sqlparse/keywords.py:33 uses a backreference \1 to match closing dollar-quote delimiters, causing On² CPU complexity when processing inputs containing...

Glances: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-32608: action-template sanitizer is bypassed by nested stat values (process 'cmdline') → OS command injection

SummaryCVE-2026-32608 "Command Injection via Process Names in Action Command Templates" was fixed commit 5680a5d by adding sanitizemustachedict, which replaces the shell operators &&, |, , with spaces in the values rendered into action command templates.The sanitizer only processes top-level stri...

PYSEC-2026-3684 ContextForge: DNS TOCTOU race condition causes SSRF protection bypass (`/admin/gateways/test`)

Summary The /admin/gateways/test endpoint validates submitted URLs by resolving the hostname at validation time and blocking private address ranges. The HTTP client independently re-resolves DNS at connection time with no IP binding between the two operations, creating a TOCTOU window exploitable...

ContextForge: DNS TOCTOU race condition causes SSRF protection bypass (`/admin/gateways/test`)

SummaryThe /admin/gateways/test endpoint validates submitted URLs by resolving the hostname at validation time and blocking private address ranges. The HTTP client independently re-resolves DNS at connection time with no IP binding between the two operations, creating a TOCTOU window exploitable...