172304 matches found
Chainlist has SSRF via MCP SSE and streamable-http transports that allows unauthenticated internal network access
Am I affected?Only if your deployment sets features.mcp.enabled = true in .chainlit/config.toml. MCP has been disabled by default since v2.7.0, so most Chainlit deployments are not affected. No authentication is required: /mcp is reachable by any client that can open a session. SummaryWhen MCP is...
eml_parser vulnerable to DoS via deeply nested parens in Received headers
Summaryemlparser strips parenthesised CFWS comments from Received: headers using a regex-based fix-point loop. The loop has quadratic time complexity in the number of nested parens. A single Received: header containing 5,000 nested parens causes 1.3 seconds of CPU saturation per parsed message;...
PYSEC-2026-3811 Chainlist has SSRF via MCP SSE and streamable-http transports that allows unauthenticated internal network access
Am I affected? Only if your deployment sets features.mcp.enabled = true in .chainlit/config.toml. MCP has been disabled by default since v2.7.0, so most Chainlit deployments are not affected. No authentication is required: /mcp is reachable by any client that can open a session. Summary When MCP ...
PYSEC-2026-3832 eml_parser vulnerable to DoS via deeply nested parens in Received headers
Summary emlparser strips parenthesised CFWS comments from Received: headers using a regex-based fix-point loop. The loop has quadratic time complexity in the number of nested parens. A single Received: header containing 5,000 nested parens causes 1.3 seconds of CPU saturation per parsed message;...
nextcloud-mcp-server: Unauthenticated `POST /webhooks/nextcloud` allows arbitrary vector data deletion when `WEBHOOK_SECRET` is unset ( default )
SummaryThe POST /webhooks/nextcloud endpoint has no authentication by default: WEBHOOKSECRET defaults to None and is never required by startup validation. When unset, the receiver accepts any unauthenticated POST. The userid is taken directly from the attacker-supplied payload and passed to Qdran...
PYSEC-2026-3866 nextcloud-mcp-server: Unauthenticated `POST /webhooks/nextcloud` allows arbitrary vector data deletion when `WEBHOOK_SECRET` is unset ( default )
Summary The POST /webhooks/nextcloud endpoint has no authentication by default: WEBHOOKSECRET defaults to None and is never required by startup validation. When unset, the receiver accepts any unauthenticated POST. The userid is taken directly from the attacker-supplied payload and passed to...
PYSEC-2026-3829 djust authentication bypass: a login_required / on_mount LiveView mount redirect does not close the WebSocket, allowing an unauthenticated client to dispatch event-handler calls
Impact djust's LiveViewConsumer mounts a LiveView over a WebSocket. When a view is gated loginrequired / permissionrequired, or an onmount hook that returns a redirect and the connecting user is not authorized, the consumer sent the client a "type":"navigate","to":... redirect frame and then...
praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` — path traversal to any writable location
Summarypraisonaiagents/memory/filememory.py::FileMemory.init constructs allmemory file paths by directly joining the userid parameter to a base path:pythonself.userpath = self.basepath / userid LINE 145 — no sanitizationNo validation or normalization is applied to userid before the path join.An...
PYSEC-2026-3886 PraisonAI has a Browser Server WebSocket origin validation bypass via unanchored regex (patch bypass of CVE-2026-40289 / GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92)
Summary praisonai/browser/server.py validates incoming WebSocket connections using a Chrome extension Origin check. The regex chrome-extension://a-z0-932 is applied with re.match, which only anchors at the start of the string, not the end. Any Origin header with more than 32 alphanumeric characte...
PraisonAI has a Browser Server WebSocket origin validation bypass via unanchored regex (patch bypass of CVE-2026-40289 / GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92)
Summarypraisonai/browser/server.py validates incoming WebSocket connections using a Chromeextension Origin check. The regex chrome-extension://a-z0-932 is applied withre.match, which only anchors at the start of the string, not the end. Any Originheader with more than 32 alphanumeric characters...
PYSEC-2026-3902 praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` — path traversal to any writable location
Summary praisonaiagents/memory/filememory.py::FileMemory.init constructs all memory file paths by directly joining the userid parameter to a base path: python self.userpath = self.basepath / userid LINE 145 — no sanitization No validation or normalization is applied to userid before the path join...
praisonaiagents vulnerable to SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)
The webcrawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initial URL: it resolves the hostname oncewith socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results. It then passes the URL toa fetcher that uses httpx.Clientfollowredirects=True - or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx isabsent,...
PraisonAI: Webhook SSRF via DNS fail-open in `JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` — bypass of CVE-2026-40114
Summarypraisonai/jobs/models.py::JobSubmitRequest.validatewebhookurl validates webhookURLs by resolving the hostname and checking whether the IP is private. When DNSresolution fails socket.gaierror, the validator silently passes the URL viaexcept socket.gaierror: pass. Additionally, even when DNS...
PYSEC-2026-3904 praisonaiagents vulnerable to SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)
The webcrawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initial URL: it resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results. It then passes the URL to a fetcher that uses httpx.Clientfollowredirects=True - or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is...
PYSEC-2026-3895 PraisonAI: Webhook SSRF via DNS fail-open in `JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` — bypass of CVE-2026-40114
Summary praisonai/jobs/models.py::JobSubmitRequest.validatewebhookurl validates webhook URLs by resolving the hostname and checking whether the IP is private. When DNS resolution fails socket.gaierror, the validator silently passes the URL via except socket.gaierror: pass. Additionally, even when...
PYSEC-2026-3890 PraisonAI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation
Summary The webhookurl field in the Jobs API silently passes validation when DNS resolution fails socket.gaierror, enabling DNS rebinding attacks. An attacker's domain can initially resolve to a public IP passing validation then switch to an internal IP before the server makes the HTTP request...
PraisonAI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation
SummaryThe webhookurl field in the Jobs API silently passes validation when DNS resolution fails socket.gaierror, enabling DNS rebinding attacks. An attacker's domain can initially resolve to a public IP passing validation then switch to an internal IP before the server makes the HTTP request...
praisonaiagents web_crawl vulnerable to SSRF via redirect-following
Summarywebcrawl an exported, model-callable tool validates only the INITIAL URL's resolved IP against a private/loopback blocklist, then fetches with httpx.Clientfollowredirects=True and never re-validates redirect targets. An attacker who controls the agent's crawl target a malicious task, or...
PYSEC-2026-3898 praisonaiagents web_crawl vulnerable to SSRF via redirect-following
Summary webcrawl an exported, model-callable tool validates only the INITIAL URL's resolved IP against a private/loopback blocklist, then fetches with httpx.Clientfollowredirects=True and never re-validates redirect targets. An attacker who controls the agent's crawl target a malicious task, or...
asteval has a Sandbox Escape via BaseException Subclasses
SummaryAn attacker who can supply expressions to asteval.Interpreter.eval can raise SystemExit,KeyboardInterrupt, GeneratorExit, or BaseException from inside the sandbox. Theseexceptions are subclasses of BaseException but not Exception, so they bypass theexcept Exception: safety net in both run...