FeePoolV0.sol#distributeMochi() will unexpectedly flush treasuryShare, causing the protocol fee cannot be properly accounted for and collected

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details distributeMochi will call buyMochi to convert mochiShare to Mochi token and call shareMochi to send Mochi to vMochi Vault and veCRV Holders. It wont touch the treasuryShare. However, in the current implementation, treasuryShare will be reset to 0. This is...

treasuryShare is Overwritten in FeePoolV0._shareMochi()

Handle leastwood Vulnerability details Impact The FeePoolV0.sol contract accrues fees upon the liquidation of undercollaterised positions. These fees are split between treasury and vMochi contracts. However, when distributeMochi is called to distribute mochi tokens to veCRV holders, both mochiSha...