Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) has a SSRF Vulnerability fix bypass on assetlinks_check with DNS Rebinding

Summary The latest deployed fix for the SSRF vulnerability is through the use of the call validhost. The code available at lines /ae34f7c055aa64fca58e995b70bc7f19da6ca33a/mobsf/MobSF/utils.pyL907-L957 is vulnerable to SSRF abuse using DNS rebinding technique. PoC The following proof of concept:...

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Overview mobsf is a Mobile Security Framework MobSF is an automated, all-in-one mobile application Android/iOS/Windows pen-testing, malware analysis and security assessment framework capable of performing static and dynamic analysis. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side...

CVE-2025-31116

Mobile Security Framework MobSF is a pen-testing, malware analysis and security assessment framework capable of performing static and dynamic analysis. The mitigation for CVE-2024-29190 in validhost uses socket.gethostbyname, which is vulnerable to SSRF abuse using DNS rebinding technique. This...

CVE-2025-31116: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Mobile Security Framework MobSF is a pen-testing, malware analysis and security assessment framework capable of performing static and dynamic analysis. The mitigation for CVE-2024-29190 in validhost uses socket.gethostbyname, which is vulnerable to SSRF abuse using DNS rebinding technique. This...

DEBIAN-CVE-2017-18190

A localhost.localdomain whitelist entry in validhost in scheduler/client.c in CUPS before 2.2.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary IPP commands by sending POST requests to the CUPS daemon in conjunction with DNS rebinding. The localhost.localdomain name is often resolved via a DNS serve...

CVE-2017-18190: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing

A localhost.localdomain whitelist entry in validhost in scheduler/client.c in CUPS before 2.2.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary IPP commands by sending POST requests to the CUPS daemon in conjunction with DNS rebinding. The localhost.localdomain name is often resolved via a DNS serve...