contract has the tendency to mint more tokens than it actually has

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If the contract does not have enough esLBR tokens to mint and transfer as rewards, users will not be able to claim their rewards even if they have earned them. Proof of Concept There is no check to ensure that the contract's balance of esLBR tokens is...

distributeRewards can revert because of the too strict slippage check

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The report highlights that the distributeRewards function can revert due to a strict slippage check. The provided proof of concept demonstrates the issue, where the slippage is set to 98%, leading to potential transaction failures. Proof of Concept...

An error could lead to coins not being returned to user

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The function swapCoins does check that SendCoins does receive them correctly here but not when sending them to the user here Proof of Concept If there is an error returning the swapped coins to the user, they will remain locked. There is no history of...

Loss of airdropped Token or NFT in NFT Bridge

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Loss of airdropped Token or NFT in NFT Bridge and Token Bridge Proof of Concept Contract L1ERC721Bridge is for bridging NFTs from L1 to L2 and it holds all the bridged NFTs. Most of the NFT projects would airdrop new NFTs for previous owners or drop ERC2...

There is no check to see if eth was successfully sent from ValidatorWithdrawalVault to StaderStakePoolsManager.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Eth may not complete successfully. As a result, the user will not receive their share from the validator. Tools Used Manual audit Recommended Mitigation Steps Add to StaderStakePoolManager.receiveWithdrawVaultUserShare function. ifmsg.value == 0 revert...

Tokens can be lost when trying to deposit in SDCaollateral.depositSDAsCollateral() or trying to withdraw SDCaollateral.withdraw()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Some tokens do not return the success of the token submission. Because Since we don’t know for sure how the SD token is implemented, we need to take this into account. Proof of Concept A detailed example is listed in: Tools Used Manual audit Recommended...

If no funds are deposited at the beginning, L1-L2 cannot be transferred out

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If user transfer tokenA-tokenB from L1 to L2, and the L2 depositstokenBtokenA is zero at the beginning.It will cause user lossing his funds. Proof of Concept First, user transfer TokenA, and it will send Message to L2 and L2 will call finalizeBridgeERC20...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #11 [1685422294441]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 11 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-03:getReward It is recommended to add balance0 before executing transfer getReward will do a transfer on rewaredsToken Since the rewards are from convex, we can't be sure what kind of token it is. we can't be sure...

Return values of weth.transfer() not checked

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Return values of weth.transfer not checked Proof of Concept The function weth.transfer has a boolean return value function transferaddress dst, uint wad public returns bool return transferFrommsg.sender, dst, wad; and they indicate errors that way instea...

Minting exposes beneficiaries to unlimited slippage while minting the token out, sending back the token in the terminal.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The amount of tokens minted/assets received when minting can be manipulated to an unlimited extent by manipulating the reserves of the pool. Proof of Concept Here the mint function mints the tokens out to the beneficiary. However the Delegate can't speci...

Inflation attack by token transfer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The first staker can inflate the exchange rate by transferring tokens directly to the contract such that subsequent stakers get minted zero wxETH. Their stake can then be unstaked by the first staker, together with their own first stake and inflation...

Inflation attack by drip

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The drip might inflate the exchange rate on an initial stake such that that subsequent stakers get minted zero wxETH. Their stake can then be unstaked by the first staker, together with their own first stake and inflation investment. Effectively, the fir...

Contracts are vulnerable to fee-on-transfer-token-related accounting issues

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability details Impact Without measuring the balance before and after the transfer, there's no way to ensure that enough tokens were transferred, in the cases where the token has a fee-on-transfer mechanic. If there are latent funds in the contract,...

Use the _assetTransferFrom function instead of _assetTransfer. This is because the tokens are held in the escrow contract, rather than being in the destination BYTES address, and thus require a transfer from the escrow contract to the recipient's address

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The msg.sender lose his stakedBytes From BYTES address not possible to send stakedBytes to msg.sender. The stakedBytes only help in escrow contract not in BYTES address. Proof of Concept function assetTransfer address asset, address to, uint256 amount...

Loss of funds - User has control of the fallback function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Imapct: Lendengine check the balanceBefore and after of token1, after sending tokens via a mintFallback function. During this fallback the user has access to theses tokens so far as it's returned + collateral the fallback is satisfied. A attacker can take out...

GiantMevAndFeesPool::afterTokenTransfer doesn't update claimed amount of sender

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact After a token transfer of GiantMevAndFeesPool's GiantLP, the receiver gets their claimed amount updated to the correct value, but the sender does not. If more than zero tokens were transferred, that amount in the sender's future rewards will be lost, and...

batchRotateLPTokens in GiantSavETHVaultPool can be used to steal LPTokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact real LPTokens can be transferred out of GiantSavETHVaultPool through fake stakingFundsVaults provided by an attacker. Proof of Concept batchRotateLPTokens takes in stakingFundsVaults, oldLPTokens, newLPTokens and rotate amounts from old to new tokens. Th...

EOAs and system contracts can be blocked from some actions by continuously transferring them zero LP tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact LPToken contains the map lastInteractedTimestamp which maps addresses to timestamps and is updated for from and to addresses after a token transfer. Many operations will check the last interaction time of an address and revert if it's too recent to comba...

Upgraded Q -> M from #407 [1668467735071]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 407 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Incorrect parameters for beforeTokenTransfer hook In LBToken.sol, the beforeTokenTransfer hook has the following parameters: 317: /// @param from The address of the owner of the token 318: /// @param to The address o...

Upgraded Q -> M from #348 [1668468155840]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 348 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L01 Wrong parameter order inside beforeTokenTransfer in LBtoken::burn call should be beforeTokenTransferaccount, address0, id, amount; --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All...