Public to all funds escape

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The LooksRareAggregator smart contract implements a bunch of functions to escape funds by the contract owner see rescueETH, rescueERC20, rescueERC721, and rescueERC1155. In this way, any funds that were accidentally sent to the contract or were lock...

Broken pro-rata formula

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The README.md states: Intended to redeem TRIBE from the effective circulating supply in exchange for a pro rata portion of a list of ERC-20 tokens. Users redeeming the same number of shares get different amounts, meaning that if you are late to redeem,...

sendToCosmos doesn't consider the ERC20 transfer fee, resulting in incorrect amount of ERC20 token

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Some ERC tokens have a fee on each transfer. The protocol doesn’t handle the fee when transferring this kind of ERC20 tokens, leading to the inconsistent amount of token actually received in the contract. Validators on the Cudos will mint more tokens to...

You should use safe casts here

Judge @GalloDaSballo has assessed the 6th item in QA Report 254 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: … You should use safe casts here: depositspidmsg.sender.amount += uint192amount; depositspidmsg.sender.amount -= uint192amount; amount : uint192amount Otherwise, if token amounts are...

User deposits don't have min. return checks

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The LPIssuer.deposit first computes balanced amounts on the user's defined tokenAmounts. The idea is that LP tokens give the same percentage share of each vault tokens' tvl, therefore the provided amounts should be balanced, meaning, the depositAmount / tvl...

Vault.withdraw mixes normalized and standard amounts

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The Vault.balance function uses the balanceOfThis function which scales "normalizes" all balances to 18 decimals. for uint8 i; i 0 controller.withdrawoutput, toWithdraw; uint256 after = IERC20output.balanceOfaddressthis; uint256 diff = after.subbalance; if dif...