Wrong design of swap() results in unexpected and unfavorable outputs

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details The current formula to calculate the amountOut for a swap is: function calculateSwap uint256 amountIn, uint256 reserveIn, uint256 reserveOut public pure returns uint256 amountOut // x Y X uint256 numerator = amountIn reserveIn reserveOut; // x + X ^ 2 uint256...

VaderRouter.calculateOutGivenIn calculates wrong swap

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The 3-path hop in VaderRouter.calculateOutGivenIn is supposed to first swap foreign assets to native assets in pool0, and then the received native assets to different foreign assets again in pool1. The first argument of VaderMath.calculateSwapamountIn,...

Swap does not provide best rate

Handle gzeon Vulnerability details Impact The custom swap curve depends on having 2 different A value, which is returned by determineA function based on current price and targetprice. targetprice also change tokenPrecisionMultipliers which is used in the swap calculation. These behavior may lead ...

Wrong assumption when updating token balance

Handle rfa Vulnerability details Impact When there is a movement of token in the swap and addliquidity function, the balances reserve , is updated based on the difference between the before and after the user transfer the token, however if there is a user that accidently send a token to this...

Leftover balance in the Executioner contract can be drained

Handle gzeon Vulnerability details Impact Leftover balance in the Executioner contract can be drained by swapping the target assetnative/erc20 into another asset. Slingshot.executeTrades allow user to execute trade using modules as long as the module is registered in the ModuleRegistry. The...

Uniswap / Sushiswap prices can be manipulated through flashloans

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The UniswapV2CSSR.getExchangeRatio uses the current reserve to derive the exchange ratio. The fact that it mixes in historic data does not matter because it still uses the current reserves which can be manipulated through flashloans in currentPriceCumulative...

Wrong calculation of erc20Delta and ethDelta

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details function fillZrxQuote IERC20 zrxBuyTokenAddress, address payable zrxTo, bytes calldata zrxData, uint256 ethAmount internal returns uint256, uint256 uint256 originalERC20Balance = 0; if!signifiesETHOrZeroaddresszrxBuyTokenAddress originalERC20Balance =...

Change require conditions can prevent fund loss when called with mistaken input data

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details function swapByQuote address zrxSellTokenAddress, uint256 amountToSell, address zrxBuyTokenAddress, uint256 minimumAmountReceived, address zrxAllowanceTarget, address payable zrxTo, bytes calldata zrxData, uint256 deadline external payable whenNotPaused...

Users can avoid paying fees for ETH swaps

Handle pants Vulnerability details Users can call Swap.swapByQuote to execute an ETH swap where they receive ETH without paying swap fee for the gained ETH. They can trick the system by setting zrxBuyTokenAddress to an address of a malicious contract and making it think they have executed an ERC2...

CVE-2021-0689

In RGBtoBGR1portable of SkSwizzleropts.h, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-10...

Wrong inequality when adding/removing liquidity in current price range

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The ConcentratedLiquidityPool.mint/burn functions add/remove liquidity when priceLower currentPrice && currentPrice priceUpper. Shouldn't it also be changed if priceLower == currentPrice? Impact Pools that mint/burn liquidity at a time where the currentPrice i...

ConcentratedLiquidityPool: incorrect feeGrowthGlobal accounting when crossing ticks

Handle hickuphh3 Vulnerability details Impact Swap fees are taken from the output. Hence, if swapping token0 for token1 zeroForOne is true, then fees are taken in token1. We see this to be the case in the initialization of feeGrowthGlobal in the swap cache feeGrowthGlobal = zeroForOne ?...

Help Might Finally Be on the Way to Fight SIM-Swap Attacks

Plus: A cybersecurity CEO arrest, an Apple Pay hack, and more of the week's top security news...

hybrid pool uses wrong non_optimal_mint_fee

Handle broccoli Vulnerability details Impact When an lp provider deposits an imbalance amount of token, a swap fee is applied. HybridPool uses the same nonOptimalMintFee as constantProductPool; however, since two pools use different AMM curve, the ideal balance is not the same. ref:...

IndexPool._pow wrong loop and does not normalize values

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The IndexPool.compute function is indented as if the if n % 2 != 0 output = output a; is inside the loop but there are actually not braces around it. It must be in the loop for the exponentiation by repeated squaring algorithm to work: function powuint256 a,...

ConstantProductPool.burnSingle swap amount computations should use balance

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The ConstantProductPool.burnSingle function is basically a burn followed by a swap and must therefore act the same way as calling these two functions sequentially. The token amounts to redeem amount0, amount1 are computed on the balance not the reserve. Howeve...

ConstantProductPool & HybridPool: Adding and removing unbalanced liquidity yields slightly more tokens than swap

Handle GreyArt Vulnerability details Impact A mint fee is applied whenever unbalanced liquidity is added, because it is akin to swapping the excess token amount for the other token. However, the current implementation distributes the minted fee to the minter as well when he should be excluded. It...

Incorrect implementation of difference in MathUtils

Handle broccoli Vulnerability details Impact The difference function of MathUtils is incorrect. Without a return statement in the if bracket, the function always returns diff = b - a, causing differencex + 1, x to be uint-1, and thus withinx + 1, x is false. The within function is used to in the...

HybridPool's flashSwap sends entire fee to barFeeTo

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The HybridPool.flashSwap function sends the entire trade fees fee to the barFeeTo. It should only send barFee fee to the barFeeTo address. Impact LPs are not getting paid at all when this function is used. There is no incentive to provide liquidity. Recommende...

HybridPool's reserve is converted to "amount" twice

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The HybridPool's reserves are stored as Bento "amounts" not Bento shares in updateReserves because balance converts the current share balance to amount balances. However, when retrieving the reserve0/1 storage fields in getReserves, they are converted to amoun...