MATRA: Modeling the Attack Surface of Agentic AI Systems -- OpenClaw Case Study

LLMs are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents with access to tools, databases, and external services, yet practitioners across different sectors lack systematic methods to assess how known threat classes translate into concrete risks within a specific agentic deployment. We present MATRA, a...

Key Encapsulation Mechanism-Based Integrated Encryption Scheme (KEM-IES)

The Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme ECIES is widely regarded as a practical method and has been adopted by multiple standards. However, the advancement of quantum computing technologies poses potential security risks to ECIES. Therefore, this study proposes a Key Encapsulation...

Can I Check What I Designed? Mapping Security Design DSLs to Code Analyzers

When assessing the potential impact of code-level vulnerabilities, e.g., discovered by automated analyzers, it is essential to consider them in the context of the system's security design. However, this is a challenging task due to the abstraction gap between security design, often specified usin...

Redefining AI Red Teaming in the Agentic Era: From Weeks to Hours

AI systems are entering critical domains like healthcare, finance, and defense, yet remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. While AI red teaming is a primary defense, current approaches force operators into manual, library-specific workflows. Operators spend weeks hand-crafting workflows -...

I Can't Recognize (Yet): Delayed Rendering to Defeat Visual Phishing Detectors

Phishing webpages are continuously polluting the Web. Plenty of countermeasures have been proposed and the most advanced techniques leverage machine-learning methods that infer whether a webpage is benign or not by inspecting its visual representation. Yet, despite the demonstrated effectiveness ...

Security Attack and Defense Strategies for Autonomous Agent Frameworks: A Layered Review with OpenClaw As a Case Study

Autonomous agent frameworks built upon large language models LLMs are evolving into complex, tool-integrated, and continuously operating systems, introducing security risks beyond traditional prompt-level vulnerabilities. As this paradigm is still at an early stage of development, a timely and...

AI-powered honeypots: Turning the tables on malicious AI agents

Generative AI allows defenders to instantly create diverse honeypots, like Linux shells or Internet of Things IoT devices, using simple text prompts. This makes deploying complex, convincing deceptive environments much easier and more scalable than traditional methods. AI-driven attacks often...

Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Prevalence, Techniques, and Objectives

As LLMs are increasingly integrated into systems that browse, retrieve, summarize, and act on web content, webpages have become an untrusted input vector for downstream model behavior. This enables site owners, contributors, and adversaries to embed instructions directly in web resources, i.e.,...

VulStyle: A Multi-Modal Pre-Training for Code Stylometry-Augmented Vulnerability Detection

We present VulStyle, a multi-modal software vulnerability detection model that jointly encodes function-level source code, non-terminal Abstract Syntax Tree AST structure, and code stylometry CStyle features. Prior work in code representation primarily leverages token-level models or full AST...

Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed As Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark against NERC Standards

The deployment of Large Language Models LLMs as assistants in electric grid operations promises to streamline compliance and decision-making but exposes new vulnerabilities to prompt-based adversarial attacks. This paper evaluates the risk of jailbreaking LLMs, i.e., circumventing safety alignmen...

UNSEEN: A Cross-Stack LLM Unlearning Defense against AR-LLM Social Engineering Attacks

Emerging AR-LLM-based Social Engineering attack e.g., SEAR is at the edge of posing great threats to real-world social life. In such AR-LLM-SE attack, the attacker can leverage AR Augmented Reality glass to capture the image and vocal information of the target, using the LLM to identify the targe...

Can SOC Operators Explain Their Decisions While Triaging Alarms? A Real-World Study

Security Operations Centers SOCs are pivotal in modern enterprises. Tasked to monitor complex network environments constantly under attack, SOCs can be active 24/7 and can include hundreds of operators supported by state-of-the-art technologies. Abundant research has studied the internal processe...

Involuntary In-Context Learning: Exploiting Few-Shot Pattern Completion to Bypass Safety Alignment in GPT-5.4

Safety alignment in large language models relies on behavioral training that can be overridden when sufficiently strong in-context patterns compete with learned refusal behaviors. We introduce Involuntary In-Context Learning IICL, an attack class that uses abstract operator framing with few-shot...

Big Tech can stop scams. They just don’t (Lock and Code S07E08)

This week on the Lock and Code podcast … A dreadful thing happens far too often whenever an older adult falls for a scam: They get blamed for it. Not the scammers who lied and cheated their victim out of money. Not law enforcement for failing to recover funds. Not even the Big Tech companies that...

Do Privacy Policies Match with the Logs? an Empirical Study of Privacy Disclosure in Android Application Logs

Privacy policies are intended to inform users about how software systems collect and handle data, yet they often remain vague or incomplete. This paper presents an empirical study of patterns in log-related statements within privacy policies and their alignment with privacy disclosures observed i...

Owner-Harm: A Missing Threat Model for AI Agent Safety

Existing AI agent safety benchmarks focus on generic criminal harm cybercrime, harassment, weapon synthesis, leaving a systematic blind spot for a distinct and commercially consequential threat category: agents harming their own deployers. Real-world incidents illustrate the gap: Slack AI...

SoK: Reshaping Research on Network Intrusion Detection Systems

Network Intrusion Detection Systems NIDS have been studied for decades. Hundreds of papers have, e.g., proposed ways to enhance, harden or bypass NIDS. However, the findings of prior literature are hardly reflected in real-world operational contexts. Such a disconnection is problematic for resear...

Terminal Wrench: A Dataset of 331 Reward-Hackable Environments and 3,632 Exploit Trajectories

The authors of this paper release Terminal Wrench, a subset of 331 terminal-agent benchmark environments, copied from the popular open benchmarks that are demonstrably reward-hackable. The data set includes 3,632 hack trajectories and 2,352 legitimate baseline trajectories across three frontier...

PT-2026-33634

Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions UltraDAG version 0.1 Description A non-council attacker can submit a signed 'SmartOp::Vote' transaction that successfully passes signature, nonce, and balance prechecks. However, the authorization check fails only after state mutation has...

Understanding Student Experiences with TLS Client Authentication

Mutual TLS mTLS provides strong, certificate-based authentication for both clients and servers, yet its adoption for user-facing websites remains rare. This paper presents a longitudinal study of mTLS usability, tracking 46 senior and graduate computer science students who configured client...