In case when not all RSR was sold on auction users can loose it

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In case when not all RSR was sold on auction users can loose it, if era was changed for them. Proof of Concept The purpose of StRSR stakers is to provide RSR tokens, that can back system in case if not enough collateral is present. During rebalance,...

StRSR.withdraw can be blocked

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact StRSR.withdraw can be blocked for user by changing basket's asset to IFFY status. User will not be able to withdraw and his funds can be seized later. Proof of Concept StRSR.withdraw function allows user to withdraw only, when basketHandler.isReady. And...

StRSR.cancelUnstake doesn't call _payoutRewards before minting new shares

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact StRSR.cancelUnstake doesn't call payoutRewards before minting new shares. As result this rewards will be distributed for new staker as well. Proof of Concept If user wants to cancel his withdraw, then he can call StRSR.cancelUnstake and mint new shares...

Unspent RSR can be stolen

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The BackingManager.handoutExcessAssets function sends all rsr that the BackingManager holds to the StRSR contract. This is done so that the rsr which is held by the BackingManager due to seizure from the StRSR contract can be sent back entirely to the...

function withdraw() in StRSR won't update contract state (totalDrafts) in all cases which can cause wrong fund distribution and fund stucking in the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function withdraw complete an account's unstaking. it transfers user draft withdrawals and updates totalDrafts. but when calculated rsrAmount is 0 code returns and won't updates totalDrafts which can cause wrong calculations as those draft items removed...

stRSR.seizeRSR() should check whether the basket of collateral is defaulted

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Backing Manager can seize RSR anytime and not within reason. RSR stakers will lose their funds. Proof of Concept Protocol states that staked RSR can be seized in the case of a collateral default, in a process that is entirely mechanistic based on on-chai...

ERC20Permit should include chainId and address to avoid replay attacks

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact This ensures a signature is only used for our given token contract address on the correct chain id. The chain id was introduced to exactly identify a network after the Ethereum Classic fork which continued to use a network id of 1. Include the chainId to...

attacker can make stakeRate to be 1 in the StRSR contract and users depositing tokens can lose funds because of the big rounding error

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact code calculates amount of stake token and rsr token based on stakeRate and if stakeRate was near 1e18 then division error is small but attacker can cause stakeRate to be 1 and that can cause users to loss up to 1e18 token during stake and unstake. Proof ...

user funds loss in withdraw() of StRSR because code don't revert when calculated rsrAmount is zero

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function withdraw in StRSR completes an account's unstaking. but when calculated amount of RSR token is 0 code still burn user draftRSR and returns. This would cause users small amount of deposits to get burned and user won't receive any funds. as withdr...