CVE-2017-9857

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SMAdata2+ communication protocol does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to man in the middle, packet injection, and replay attacks. Any setting change, authentication packet, scouting packet, etc. can be...

CVE-2017-9851

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. By sending nonsense data or setting up a TELNET session to the database port of Sunny Explorer, the application can be crashed. NOTE: the vendor reports that the maximum possible damage is a communication failure. Also, only Sunny Boy...

CVE-2017-9853

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. All inverters have a very weak password policy for the user and installer password. No complexity requirements or length requirements are set. Also, strong passwords are impossible due to a maximum of 12 characters and a limited set of...

CVE-2017-9854

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. By sniffing for specific packets on the localhost, plaintext passwords can be obtained as they are typed into Sunny Explorer by the user. These passwords can then be used to compromise the overall device. NOTE: the vendor reports that...

CVE-2017-9856

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. Sniffed passwords from SMAdata2+ communication can be decrypted very easily. The passwords are "encrypted" using a very simple encryption algorithm. This enables an attacker to find the plaintext passwords and authenticate to the device...

CVE-2017-9857

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SMAdata2+ communication protocol does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to man in the middle, packet injection, and replay attacks. Any setting change, authentication packet, scouting packet, etc. can be...

CVE-2017-9858

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. By sending crafted packets to an inverter and observing the response, active and inactive user accounts can be determined. This aids in further attacks such as a brute force attack as one now knows exactly which users exist and which do no...

CVE-2017-9859

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The inverters make use of a weak hashing algorithm to encrypt the password for REGISTER requests. This hashing algorithm can be cracked relatively easily. An attacker will likely be able to crack the password using offline crackers. This...

CVE-2017-9860

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. An attacker can use Sunny Explorer or the SMAdata2+ network protocol to update the device firmware without ever having to authenticate. If an attacker is able to create a custom firmware version that is accepted by the inverter, the invert...

CVE-2017-9861

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SIP implementation does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to replay attacks, packet injection attacks, and man in the middle attacks. An attacker is able to successfully use SIP to communicate with the...

CVE-2017-9863

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. If a user simultaneously has Sunny Explorer running and visits a malicious host, cross-site request forgery can be used to change settings in the inverters for example, issuing a POST request to change the user password. All Sunny Explorer...

CVE-2017-9851

CVE-2017-9851 affects SMA Solar Technology Sunny Explorer; vulnerability arises when nonsense data is sent or a TELNET session is opened to the Sunny Explorer database port, causing the application to crash. Affected products/versions include Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21, and Sunny Tripower TL-10 ...

CVE-2017-9854

CVE-2017-9854 affects SMA Solar Technology Sunny Explorer-related components. The issue allows an attacker to sniff specific localhost packets and read plaintext passwords as users type them into Sunny Explorer, potentially compromising the entire device. Affected products are Sunny Boy TLST-21/T...

CVE-2017-9856

The connected PT-2017-19222 entry confirms concrete technical details: SMA Solar Technology inverters (Sunny Boy TLST-21/TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10/TL-30) use a simple encryption algorithm for SMAdata2+ passwords, allowing an attacker to decrypt passwords to plaintext and authenticate to the ...

CVE-2017-9857

The vulnerability CVE-2017-9857 in SMA Solar Technology products stems from the SMAdata2+ protocol: it does not properly use authentication with encryption, making it vulnerable to man-in-the-middle, packet injection, and replay attacks. Affected are Sunny Boy TLST-21/TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-...

CVE-2017-9858

CVE-2017-9858 affects SMA Solar Technology inverters (Sunny Boy TLST-21, TL-21; Sunny Tripower TL-10, TL-30). By sending crafted packets to the inverter and observing responses, an attacker can determine which user accounts are active or inactive, enabling brute-force planning. The vendor notes t...

CVE-2017-9859

CVE-2017-9859 concerns SMA Solar Technology inverters (Sunny Boy TLST-21/TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10/TL-30). The issue is use of a weak hashing algorithm to encrypt passwords for REGISTER requests, which can be cracked offline, enabling an attacker to recover the password and register at SMA s...

CVE-2017-9861

The CVE-2017-9861 impact concerns SMA Solar Technology products (Sunny Boy TLST-21/TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10/TL-30) where the SIP channel lacks proper authentication with encryption. The underlying issue allows replay, packet injection, and man-in-the-middle attacks, enabling an attacker on ...

CVE-2017-9863

SMA Solar Technology Sunny Explorer-related CSRF vulnerability (CVE-2017-9863) affects Sunny Boy TLST-21/TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10/TL-30. When a user runs Sunny Explorer and visits a malicious host, an unauthenticated attacker can exploit cross-site request forgery to change inverter setting...

CVE-2017-9855

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. A secondary authentication system is available for Installers called the Grid Guard system. This system uses predictable codes, and a single Grid Guard code can be used on any SMA inverter. Any such code, when combined with the installer...