Upgraded Q -> 2 from #763 [1682682097179]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 763 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: In line 87 there's a check for a pause setting. If staking is currently paused, the operation will fail. Similar to the edge case described above, line 88 verifies that msg.value != 0. The division in the weighted...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #623 [1682589089611]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 623 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L‑05 Stuck dust in SafEth contract for division When stake in the contract SafEth some WEIs could be stuck in the contract because the equation uint256 ethAmount = msg.value weight / totalWeight;, in example: ethAmou...

Spot UniswapV3 pricing for rETH when staking in SafEth can lead to loss of user funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can craft a set of transactions so that when they are depositing funds in the SafEth contract, using the stake function, they can understate the value of existing deposits preDepositPrice value, while overstating the value of their deposit...

Derivative Pool Issue can Lead to Loss User Funds when Unstaking

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In all withdraw functions of derivatives, there is no check for sending zero Ether back to the safEth contract. It is important to note that the addressmsg.sender.callvalue: 0"" function returns true even when transferring a zero value. On the other hand...

User should be able to set the slippage amount willing to pay

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The impact of this finding is that users may be required to pay higher transaction fees than necessary due to the absence of an adjustable slippage feature. This could discourage users from using the SafEth contract and negatively impact its adoption...