The LybraRETHVault.depositEtherToMint doesn't keep record of user's ether deposits which results in loss for the user.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact High: User will lose his deposited ether. Proof of Concept The collateralAsset address variable which is used in LybraPeUSDVaultBase is assumed to be stETH token address Now the depositEtherToMint function from contract LybraRETHVault.sol which inherits...

Mitigation of M-08: Issue NOT mitigated

Mitigated issue M-08: Possible DoS on unstake The issue is that a potential time-lock in Rocket Pool may cause RocketTokenRETHInterfacerethAddress.burnamount to revert, which prevents frequent withdrawals and unstakes. Mitigation review Reth.withdraw still calls...

Upgraded Q -> 3 from #883 [1682591277339]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 883 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: As such, if deposit or withdraw reverts for any derivative, stake and unstake will fail. This could cause stake and unstake to permanently revert for an prolonged period of time, as it is possible for deposit and...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #883 [1682591284215]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 883 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: This could cause stake and unstake to permanently revert for an prolonged period of time, as it is possible for deposit and withdraw to revert due to unchecked external conditions: Reth The rocket pool DAO can disabl...

Burning rETH at the unstake might revert

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Unstaking is blocked. Proof of Concept When unstaking the withdraw of each derivative is called. Reth.withdraw withdraws by calling RocketTokenRETHInterfacerethAddress.burnamount. But RocketTokenRETH.burn reverts if the ETH balance is insufficient for th...

Reth flashloan attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Using a flashloan to manipulate rETH/ETH price a hacker can receive more SafEth shares for the same amount of ether, thus draining all three derivative contracts rETH, SfrxEth and WstEth. Proof of Concept Reth.poolPrice depends on UniswapV3 pool.slot0...