PYSEC-2026-3615 QTINeon has unauthenticated relay-to-host amplification via unbounded RECONNECT_REQUEST forwarding

Impact The relay's reconnect handler forwards every RECONNECTREQUEST to the host without deduplication or a size cap on the pendingReconnects map, unlike the connect flow which guards against this with maxPendingConnections. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid session ID can send...

GHSA-85RG-P3FR-XC2F QTINeon has unauthenticated relay-to-host amplification via unbounded RECONNECT_REQUEST forwarding

Impact The relay's reconnect handler forwards every RECONNECTREQUEST to the host without deduplication or a size cap on the pendingReconnects map, unlike the connect flow which guards against this with maxPendingConnections. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid session ID can send...

QTINeon has unauthenticated relay-to-host amplification via unbounded RECONNECT_REQUEST forwarding

Impact The relay's reconnect handler forwards every RECONNECTREQUEST to the host without deduplication or a size cap on the pendingReconnects map, unlike the connect flow which guards against this with maxPendingConnections. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid session ID can send...

CVE-2026-54609

QtINeon CVE-2026-54609 affects NeonRelay (Java, Python, TypeScript). The vulnerability is unauthenticated relay-to-host amplification via unbounded RECONNECT_REQUEST forwarding in handleReconnectRequest, where packets are forwarded to the host without bounding. This creates a denial-of-service pa...

CVE-2026-54609 QTINeon has unauthenticated relay-to-host amplification via unbounded RECONNECT_REQUEST forwarding

QTI Neon is a minimal, game-agnostic, relay-based UDP multiplayer protocol library. In version 1.0.0, the relay's handleReconnectRequest forwards RECONNECTREQUEST packets to the host without bounding them, so an unauthenticated client can drive relay-to-host amplification and cause a denial of...

PT-2026-65649

Impact The relay's reconnect handler forwards every RECONNECT REQUEST to the host without deduplication or a size cap on the pendingReconnects map, unlike the connect flow which guards against this with maxPendingConnections. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid session ID can send...