337 matches found
ExploitGym AI Exploit Benchmark Tool
ExploitGym is a large-scale, realistic benchmark built from real-world vulnerabilities designed to evaluate AI agents' ability to develop exploits...
CyberGym-E2E: Scalable Real-World Benchmark for AI Agents' End-To-End Cybersecurity Capabilities
AI has the potential to transform cybersecurity by enabling systems that can autonomously detect, analyze, and remediate software vulnerabilities. However, existing cybersecurity evaluations of AI systems are limited in scale or scope, and fail to capture the end-to-end lifecycle of real-world...
The Role of Domain-Specific Features in Malware Detection: A MacOS Case Study
Despite the growing popularity of macOS among end users and enterprise systems, malware research has primarily focused on Windows and Android operating systems, leaving the problem of macOS malware detection relatively unexplored. Indeed, the specificity of the operating system and the unique...
Less panic patching, more precision
Welcome to this week's edition of the Threat Source newsletter. Recently, Martin closed his introduction with a warning: Ready or not, the time of much patching is coming. I've been chewing on that one for a while because I'm rethinking my own enrichment pipelines along these lines, and the...
Towards Demystifying and Repairing LLM-In-The-Loop Vulnerabilities
Large Language ModelsLLMs have been actively integrated into modern software systems as critical components. LLM-in-the-loop vulnerabilities, where vulnerabilities are introduced by LLMs and their dependent downstream components, such as frameworks, introduce new risks. Although some benchmark...
Measuring Real-World Prompt Injection Attacks in LLM-Based Resume Screening
LLMs are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. However, this vulnerability has been primarily demonstrated conceptually in academic studies or through a few anecdotal case studies. Its prevalence and impact in real-world LLM-based applications are largely unexplored. In this work, we present th...
VIPER-MCP: Detecting and Exploiting Taint-Style Vulnerabilities in Model Context Protocol Servers
Model Context Protocol MCP has emerged as a standard interface for connecting LLM agents to external tools. Because MCP servers expose privileged operations such as shell execution, network access, and file-system manipulation to agent-driven invocation, implementation flaws in tool handlers can...
Agent Security Is a Systems Problem
We take the position that agent security must be approached as a systems problem: the AI model powering the agent must be treated as an untrusted component, and security invariants must be enforced at the system level. Through this lens, efforts to increase model robustness the dominant viewpoint...
AI Voice Cloning: The Technology Behind It, Whoβs Building It, and Where Itβs Headed
Explore AI voice cloning technology, leading companies, real-world uses, ethical risks, and future trends shaping synthetic voices...
No Attack Required: Semantic Fuzzing for Specification Violations in Agent Skills
LLM-powered agents can silently delete documents, leak credentials, or transfer funds on a routine user request, not because the agent was attacked, but because the skill it invoked broke its own declared safety rules. We call these specification violations: benign inputs cause a skill to breach...
DCVD: Dual-Channel Cross-Modal Fusion for Joint Vulnerability Detection and Localization
Software vulnerability detection plays a critical role in ensuring system security, where real-world auditing requires not only determining whether a function is vulnerable but also pinpointing the specific lines responsible. However, existing approaches either rely on a single information source...
From Controlled to the Wild: Evaluation of Pentesting Agents for the Real-World
AI pentesting agents are increasingly credible as offensive security systems, but current benchmarks still provide limited guidance on which will perform best in real-world targets. Existing evaluation protocols assess and optimize for predefined goals such as capture-the-flag, remote code...
SkillScope: Toward Fine-Grained Least-Privilege Enforcement for Agent Skills
Agent Skills have become a practical way to extend LLM agents by packaging metadata, natural-language instructions, and executable resources into reusable capability bundles. However, this growing Skill ecosystem introduces a new compliance risk: a Skill may perform high-impact actions that excee...
Profiling for Pennies: Unveiling the Privacy Iceberg of LLM Agents
Large Language Models LLMs have revolutionized how information are collected, aggregated, and reasoned. However, this enables a novel and accessible vector of privacy intrusion: the automated and in-depth personal profiling; this engenders a chilling effect of "peepers everywhere". Existing...
Zero Day Attacks: Novel Behaviour or Novel Vulnerability?
Zero-day attacks pose severe cybersecurity risks due to their high success rates and stealth. Because signature-based approaches struggle to detect such attacks, building Intrusion Detection Systems IDSs for detecting zero-day attacks is essential. We contend that for an IDS to be effective it mu...
clan-nxt-toolkit
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DETOUR: A Practical Backdoor Attack against Object Detection
Object detection OD is critical to real-world vision systems, yet existing backdoor attacks on detection transformers DETRs for OD tasks rely on patch-wise triggers optimized at fixed locations with minimal perturbations. Such attacks overlook that backdoor triggers in the real world may appear a...
Ghost in the Agent: Redefining Information Flow Tracking for LLM Agents
Autonomous Large Language Model LLM agents are increasingly deployed to conduct complex tasks by interacting with external tools, APIs, and memory stores. However, processing untrusted external data exposes these agents to severe security threats, such as indirect prompt injection and unauthorize...
LLM-and-MCP
Detection and Exploitation of Vulnerabilities in Android Appli...
Bug-Bounty-Hunting-Methodology-2026
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