In the OpenSSL compatibility layer implementation, the function RAND_poll() was not behaving as expected and leading to the potential for predictable values returned from RAND_bytes() after fork() is called. This can lead to weak or predictable random numbers generated in applications that are both using RAND_bytes() and doing fork() operations. This only affects applications explicitly calling RAND_bytes() after fork() and does not affect any internal TLS operations. Although RAND_bytes() documentation in OpenSSL calls out not being safe for use with fork() without first calling RAND_poll(), an additional code change was also made in wolfSSL to make RAND_bytes() behave similar to OpenSSL after a fork() call without calling RAND_poll(). Now the Hash-DRBG used gets reseeded after detecting running in a new process. If making use of RAND_bytes() and calling fork() we recommend updating to the latest version of wolfSSL. Thanks to Per Allansson from Appgate for the report.

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Advanced Poll Script SQL Injection / Cross Site Scripting

Exploit Title: XSS and Authentication bypass in Advanced Poll Script Date: 26-apr-2010 Author: Sid3^effects Software Link: N/a CVE : Code : XSS and Authentication bypass in Advanced Poll Script Vendor:http://www.2daybiz.com/ Author:Sid3^effects Description : Advanced Poll is a polling system with...