Griefing attack is possible as NFTXStakingZap, PalmNFTXStakingZap, NFTXMarketplaceZap rely on zero vault token balance for LP and minting

Handle hyh Vulnerability details Impact NFTXStakingZap and PalmNFTXStakingZap liquidity provision and NFTXMarketplaceZap minting will be blocked as addLiquidity and mint functions will revert all the time. An attacker can transfer a tiny amount of vault tokens to NFTXStakingZap/PalmNFTXStakingZap...

NFTXMarketplaceZap: Balance check can result in DOS

Handle GreyArt Vulnerability details Impact The mint721 and mint1155 functions check that the correct number of vault tokens have been minted, after accounting for mint fees. uint256 balance = count BASE - INFTXVaultvault.mintFeecount; requirebalance == IERC20Upgradeablevault.balanceOfaddressthis...

Marketplace Zap mints can be denied

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The NFTXMarketPlaceZap.mint721 function verifies if the contract indeed received the expected amount of vault tokens of balance = count BASE - count INFTXVaultvault.mintFee by checking: function mint721 uint256 vaultId, uint256 memory ids internal returns...

NFTXMarketplaceZap.sol#buyAnd***() should return unused weth/eth back to msg.sender instead of to

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details function buyAndSwap721WETH uint256 vaultId, uint256 memory idsIn, uint256 memory specificIds, uint256 maxWethIn, address calldata path, address to public nonReentrant requireto != address0; requireidsIn.length != 0;...

NFTXMarketplaceZap and NFTXStakingZap don't check WETH.transfer result

Handle hyh Vulnerability details Impact Transactions will not be reverted on failed transfer, setting system state as if it was successful. User will have the remainder funds frozen within the system. Proof of Concept NFTXStakingZap and NFTXMarketplaceZap perform unchecked transfers in several...

Attacker can break addLiquidity721() by transferring vaultToken to the contract

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details function addLiquidity721WETH uint256 vaultId, uint256 memory ids, uint256 minWethIn, uint256 wethIn, address to internal returns uint256, uint256, uint256 address vault = nftxFactory.vaultvaultId; requirevault != address0, "NFTXZap: Vault does not exist"; //...

Use safeTransfer/safeTransferFrom consistently

Handle sirhashalot Vulnerability details Impact A transfer function can fail without reverting. To prepare for such situations, a contract should either check the return value of the transfer function or use a solution such as Open Zeppelin's SafeTransfer function. Only a few places in this proje...

A vault can be locked from MarketplaceZap and StakingZap

Handle p4st13r4 Vulnerability details Impact Any user that owns a vToken of a particular vault can lock the functionalities of NFTXMarketplaceZap.sol and NFTXStakingZap.sol for everyone. Every operation performed by the marketplace, that deals with vToken minting, performs this check:...

Zap contracts vulnerable to DoS

Handle shenwilly Vulnerability details Impact If the zap contract has a non-zero balance of vault token then users won't be able to mint that particular vault. This is because the minting functions only check if the minted token is equal to the current balance inside the contract, which will alwa...

_mint721() function can be broken because of strict equality check on token balance

Handle jayjonah8 Vulnerability details Impact In NFTXMarketplaceZap.sol the mint721 function has a require check that the balance must be equal to the amount of vault tokens in the contract. uint256 balance = count BASE - count INFTXVaultvault.mintFee; requirebalance ==...

NFTXMarketplaceZap Performs A Dangerous Equality Check Which Can Brick Contract

Handle leastwood Vulnerability details Impact NFTXMarketplaceZap provides an interface for users to interact with NFTX vaults by buying, selling and swapping ERC1155/ERC721 tokens. The mint721 and mint1155 functions perform strict equality checks on the vaults token balance for the...

buyAndSwap1155WETH() function may cause loss of user assets

Handle cccz Vulnerability details Impact In the NFTXMarketplaceZap.sol contract, the buyAndSwap1155WETH function uses the WETH provided by the user to exchange VaultToken, but when executing the buyVaultToken method, msg.value is used instead of maxWethIn. Since msg.value is 0, the call will fail...