The bool return value of variable success is not checked/handled in removeCollateral() of NFTPairWithOracle.sol

Adding this issue from 77 which highlights a high-risk issue dupe of 21 --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Blocking of Legitimate Liquidation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Issue: removeCollateral calculates whether liquidation is allowed via requirerate.mulloanParams.ltvBPS / BPS amount, "NFT is still valued";. An arbitrarily high ltvBPS will effectively bypass the oracle price and block liquidation. Consequences: A malicious...

Reentrancy in removeCollateral() / requestLoan()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is a potential reentrancy bug they may exist between requestLoan and removeCollateral that allows a user to have requested a loan while maintaining ownership of the collateral. This bug is present in both NFTPair and NFTPairWithOracle. The reentran...

Users Who approve() ERC20 Tokens for NFTPair of NFTPairWithOracle Contracts May Have Their Allowances Stole By Any User

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User's who approve ERC20 or any other token type excluding the collateral token may have their balances stolen by any user. The ACTIONCALL allows users to call any function on any smart contract excluding this, collateral and bentoBox. Thus, if any user...

Oracle failure allows NFT to be stolen

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any temporary failure in an oracle relaying a price allows the NFT collateral to be removed by the lender, even if the value of the NFT is still far above the agreed-upon liquidation value. Considering that oracle price retrieval failure is accounted for...

Lender can unconditionally liquidate borrower by changing oracle

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In NFTPairWithOracle.updateLoanParams, a lender is allowed change the oracle. If the lender set it some oracle that return invalid price, he can call removeCollateral immediately to liquidate the borrower. Proof of Concept function updateLoanParamsuint25...

Params.oracle can be changed to a fake one by front running NFTPairWithOracle's lend function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact As neither lend, nor updateLoanParams functions verify params.oracle, the lend call can be front run by a malicious borrower with changing params.oracle to a non-market one. The front run will be an updateLoanParams call where borrower introduces fake...

NFTPairWithOracle's _lend ignores accepted.oracle and allows to start loan with empty params.oracle

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact As lend doesn't require params.oracle to be valid, while removeCollateral does, the loan initiation with an empty oracle can lead to ignoring collateral valuation. As the deals are OTC this can be seen as lender decision. However, lend ignores...

[WP-H8] Special ERC721 compatible implementation may allow an attacker to requestLoan without transferring in the NFT collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details NFT is a fragmented standard, for certain non-standard ERC721 implementations, they may have built-in hooks that can be used to re-enter the contract. Just like ERC777 to ERC20. For example, if the collateral NFT got a pre-transfer hook to the receiver of the...

Lender can adjust ltvBPS and instantly sieze collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact After the loan is accepted and is in the LOANOUTSTANDING phase, updateLoanParams allows the lender to update the TokenLoanParams.ltvBPS parameter. The require check allows for the parameters to change as long as they are favorable for the borrower, but...

Reentrancy at _requestLoan allows requesting a loan without supplying collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details requestLoan makes an external call to the collateral contract before updating the NFTPair contract state. Impact If the ERC721 collateral has a afterTokenTransfer hook, The NFTPair contract can be reentered, and a loan can be requested without the borrower...