EulerOS Virtualization 2.9.0 : kernel (EulerOS-SA-2023-1223)

According to the versions of the kernel packages installed, the EulerOS Virtualization installation on the remote host is affected by the following vulnerabilities : - Insufficient control flow management for the IntelR 82599 Ethernet Controllers and Adapters may allow an authenticated user to...

RuniverseLandMinter._mintTokensUsingTokenId does not verify that the tokenId matches the corresponding plotSize

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The first eight digits of the RuniverseLand TokenID indicate the corresponding plotSize of the NFT owner can call RuniverseLandMinter.ownerMintUsingTokenId directly to mint the NFT for a specific TokenID In RuniverseLandMinter.mintTokensUsingTokenId, the...

When liquidation is not locked, anyone can liquidate another persons' collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Petty users can liquidate other people's NFT immediately when the liquidation threshold is reached. Proof of Concept The owner controls the function setLiquidationsLocked and calls the function when a collateral needs to be liquidated function...

Contract owner can drain all NFT collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact To add NFTs as collateral to the protocol and it to create debt, the owner has to approve each NFT contract address first. As anyone can create their own papr vaults with arbitrary allowed NFTs by design, this opens the possibility for malicious actors t...

NFT operators of OpenZeppelin-based NFTs can issue debt

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The Papr protocol allows NFT owners to issue debt against NFTs they deposit, denominated in papr. The solmate contracts that are used as imports for the project do not allow an operator on the NFT to participate in debt-creation; the ERC721 contract...

Liquidation logic is incorrect in some conditions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Because purchaseLiquidationAuctionNFT function clears remaining debt of debtor if he has no more collateral, it's possible that when 2 auctions exists in same time, liquidation logic will not work properly and debt will be nullified before last auction i...

NFT owner only is allowed for liquidation, this may not work for all the cases, the debt can be insolvent

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When bad debt is not paid or not able to recover the through auction of NFT, then the debt will be insolvent. Proof of Concept Contract allows for liquidation to recover the debt. Also, it has the auctioning mechanism to recover the debt by selling the...

Operator can buy papr with PaprController as the debtor.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact This requires that an NFT is in auction. When an operator calls purchaseLiquidationAuctionNFT the price variable is determined by a call to purchaseNFTAndUpdateVaultIfNeeded which calls purchaseNFT which calls safeTransferFrom on the auctionAssetContract...

Malicious user able to start auction to any NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any address can start an auction for an NFT, regardless of whether they are the actual owner of the NFT. This vulnerability could allow an attacker to start auctions for NFTs that they do not own, potentially leading to financial losses for the true owne...

Early NFT collections such as CryptoPunks and MoonCats can not be used as a collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Early NFT collections such as CryptoPunks, EtherRocks and MoonCats are not compliant with ERC721 standard. therefore, they can not be used as a collateral since transferring will fail. I beleive it would be a huge advantage for the protocol to support su...

Initial value of auction starter discount is set wrong

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The protocol offers a discount for auction starters when purchasing the liquidated NFT as an incentive for users to start an auction. I believe the intended discount should be 10%, but is currently implemented at 90%. 90% is too massive a discount for th...

PUNK does not conform to ERC721 standard hence safeTransferFrom from solmate does not work

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Since protocol's intended NFT target is PUNK currently, the protocol will be hugely affected. Proof of Concept Attempts to transfer the NFT is done in 2 places. 1. removeCollateral 2. purchaseNFT Firstly, this means that once a collateral is added to the...

Reentrancy attack allows to get loan for free

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Reentrancy attack allows to get loan for free when startLiquidationAuction is called on last collateral token. Proof of Concept When user has a bad debt, then anyone can start auction for his nft. To purchase token, liquidator can call...

Liquidations force users into bigger debts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User's uncovered debt increases when auction starts on their collateral token. The increased debt may be too big for a user and they might not be able to repay it, which forces them to wait for the auctioned token to be sold and accrue more debt due to t...

purchaseLiquidationAuctionNFT() may incorrectly returned the Auction funds to the liquidated user

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact may incorrectly returned the Auction funds to the liquidated user in purchaseLiquidationAuctionNFT, After someone purchases the auction NFT, the amount of the auction received will be distributed. In the existing logic, when the amount of the auction is...

Oracle may return a stale price that is not resistant to flash crashes

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Oracle may return a stale price in the event of a flash crash which will affect protocol calculation of maxDebt and affect protocol. Proof of Concept Protocol uses the time weighted average pricing of 30 days to check the price of the NFT. uint256 consta...

PaprController.sol: reservoir oracle price equal to 0 allows bypassing NFT liquidations

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When there is a reservoir oracle message with the price of the NFT equal to zero, the debt of a vault will be reset in the PaprController.purchaseLiquidationAuctionNFT function when a NFT is bought in an auction. So the borrower can now withdraw all othe...

Some NFTs could be possibly stuck and can not be withdrawn when removing the collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When adding a collateral, the protocol transfers the NFT from the user to the contract by calling ERC721's transferFrom, and when removing the collateral, safeTransferFrom is called to allow for onReceive hook to be triggered as intended by the protocol...

Start an auction without an NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Requires that the account being liquidated has more than one NFT in PaprController. When an operator calls purchaseLiquidationAuctionNFT the price variable is determined by a call to purchaseNFTAndUpdateVaultIfNeeded which calls purchaseNFT which calls...

Wrong implemention of ERC721TokenReceiver interface leads to incorrect collateral ownership and NFT loss

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact To add a collateral, one could send the NFT directly to the contract, onERC721Received is called then to handle adding the collateral to the vault. However, if the user sends the NFT via an operator then the ownership of the collateral will be assigned t...