Unlimited minting of Canto Bio NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is no max limit on the number of Bio NFT that can be minted by a user. This allows an attacker to mint himself any amount of Bio NFT he want. Proof of Concept function testMint public string memory bio = "TEST BIO"; vm.prankalice; for uint i = 0; i...

Incorrect use of the && Operator will allow anyone to fuse a new Namespace NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any caller can easily mint NFT if they provide a valid list of characters with the appropriate trays, the problem with this code is in this check if trayOwner != msg.sender && tray.getApprovedtrayID != msg.sender && !tray.isApprovedForAlltrayOwner,...

Why does prelaunch checking do only for namespaceNFT case in Tray.burn?

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In function Tray.burnid, we can see prelaunchMinted checking. But that part is inside if msg.sender == namespaceNFT. We should take care about it in all cases. Proof of Concept function burnuint256 id external address trayOwner = ownerOfid; if namespaceN...

Lack of token approval reverts the overall trade

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Since the user has not approved the params.collateralAmount, calling the safeTransferFrom function will result in a revert due to the lack of token approval. The Exchange contract not receive any collateralAmount. Proof of Concept...

Implementation error in Namespace.fuse() leads to a wrong unicode representation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The font class of a tile will be always considered as 0 emoji when a user registers a name. Proof of Concept To register a name, fuse is used taking as input the data of the characters. The name to register is a string created by converting the character...

Namespace.sol fuse() function incorrectly calculates fused bytes

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The fuse function in Namespace.sol incorrectly calculates fused bytes. The first parameter to the characterToUnicodeBytes function is font class, which is always set to 0. This leads to an incorrect calculation of the tokenToName value, resulting in a...

Unsafe safeTransfer function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The safeTransfer function of the SafeERC20.sol contract check that the target is actually a contract before calling it, this is to avoid calls to address with no code that will always return succes = true. For exemple if you use token.safeTransfer and...

Namespace tokenName has only emojis.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The tokenName and image of Namespace should always be the same. The image is correct but the tokenName only consists of emojis. Duplicate names are checked on the tokenName and not on the image. Because of this a tile of font class 1 with character index...

Unsafe system contract verification

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact On the following function: function isSystemContractaddress address internal pure returns bool return uint160address = uint160MAXSYSTEMCONTRACTADDRESS; it does check whether an address is a system contract by checking whether it is smaller than...

Gas check inaccuracy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Since the gas forwarded will be limited to 63/64 of the total gasleft, L1 transactions will be vulnerable of being reverted. To achieve 1:1 partity with the EVM, the ZKEVM should account for 1/64 rule. Please refer to the 1/64 rule here. The actual amoun...

Wrong block number calculation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. The calculation for the block info is currentBlockNumber + 1 BLOCKINFOBLOCKNUMBERPART + newTimestamp. getBlockNumberAndTimestamp, getBlockTimestamp, getBlockNumber all incorrectly calculate the current...

Wrong Implementation of EIP-712

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The EIP-712 uses several parameters. Those parameters are exactly: EIP712Domain string name; string version; uint256 chainId; address verifyingContract; As you can see on the following Domain, ZkSync, is missing one parameter: bytes32 constant...

_l1Receiver may lose the token amount

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact l1Receiver lose the token amount Proof of Concept function withdrawaddress l1Receiver external payable override uint256 amount = msg.value; // Silent burning of the ether unchecked balanceaddressthis -= amount; totalSupply -= amount; // Send the L2 log, ...

Missing check for NFT contract, a bad actor can mint a PFP NFT without having a CID NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Missing check for NFT contract, a bad actor can mint a PFP NFT without having a CID NFT. Proof of Concept The ProfilePicture.mint is used to mint a new PFP NFT. function mintaddress nftContract, uint256 nftID external uint256 tokenId = ++numMinted; if...

Reentrancy in validateTransaction function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The contract can be called by an attacker several times until the money are depleted. The contract owner may suffer financial damages as a result of this vulnerability. Description The validateTransaction function in line 66-71 accepts external calls and...

Lack of a contract existence check may lead to undesired behavior

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The functions NeoTokyoStaker.assetTransferFrom and NeoTokyoStaker.assetTransfer are both used as helper functions to perform low level calls, both functions revert if the low-level call fails, but no checks are made if the contract that's being called...

Permit authorized callers can burn any amount of BYTES 2.0 tokens from an arbitrary address

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Using the burn function of BYTES 2.0, an authorized caller can burn an arbitrary amount of tokens from any address. I'm aware that it was mentioned in README.md of the project that this type of finding is out of the scope. but I believe it is still...

Wrong accounting of share leading to incorrect amount of BYTES be minted per second

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In NeoTokyoStaker, staker is a competitive system where stakers compete for a fixed emission rate in each of the S1 Citizen, S2 Citizen, and LP token staking pools. For each staking pool, there are some reward windows. Each reward window has different...

the S1 Citizen and S2 Citizen loops in the second getStakerPositions are not working properly

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact This can result in the second loop not running correctly and resulting in an error in the logic, in case if the length of the stakerS1Positionstaker or stakerS2Positionstaker arrays is very large, the operation of adding or subtracting the index on...

Huge over calculating user rewards

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Huge over calculating user rewards When user claim rewards for the first time rewards over calculated Proof of Concept getPoolReward function uses ''uint256 timeSinceReward = block.timestamp - lastRewardTime'' formula to calculate period of time that...