Event Emission

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Events such as Swap, Deposit, and Withdraw are emitted with the primitive address as the user parameter, which might not be the actual user msg.sender initiating the transaction. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add...

Lack of Slippage Protection in CurveTricryptoAdapter::primitiveOutputAmount and Curve2PoolAdapter::primitiveOutputAmount

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Due to the lack of slippage protection in the CurveTricryptoAdapter::primitiveOutputAmountand Curve2PoolAdapter::primitiveOutputAmount, user deposits and withdrawals are vulnerable to being sandwich attacked. Proof of Concept...

Using block.timestamp as the deadline/expiry invites MEV

Lines of code 307 Vulnerability details Impact Passing block.timestamp as the expiry/deadline of an operation does not mean "require immediate execution" - it means "whatever block this transaction appears in, I'm comfortable with that block's timestamp". Providing this value means that a malicio...

Sandwich attack on buy()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function Market:buy does not check or take in a minimum buy amount. This makes users' funds vulnerable to sandwich attacks. buy will increase shareDataid.tokenCount, and thus change the exchange rate of share price. price, fee =...

MEV-attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Tokens trades can be sandwiched for profit. Proof of concept The price of tokens is proportional to the supply with the current LinearBoningCurve. An attacker can therefore sandwich a buy transaction with a buy at the first lower price range followed by ...

Possible sandwhich attack whenever a user with a surplus of allowance calls market.buy().

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Because the exact amount of allowance a user needs to mint his desired amount of shares isnt always a round number as shown via the market.getBuyPriceid, amount;. There could be users who might trust the contract blind & approve their entire balance in...

No slippage control on deposit of LRTDepositPool.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is no slippage control on depositAsset of LRTDepositPool, which expose user to sandwich attack. Proof of Concept Any deposit can be sandwiched in LRTDepositPool, especially when the pool is not balanced. Exploit Scenario: Bob, a normal user, calls...

decreaseVotingPower() can be front-ran by an attacker to claim an amount of assets from the TokenDistributor more than he should be able to claim or withdraw more assets than he should be able to claim through rageQuit()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Overview of the vulnerability / PoC The function decreaseVotingPower in PartyGovernanceNFT does not have a front-running protection against a user claiming his share of a distribution or a user ragequitting using a token which is going to get it's voting power...

increaseTotalVotingPower() can be front-ran by an attacker with a call to rageQuit() in order to withdraw more assets than the attacker should be able to claim.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Overview of the vulnerability / PoC The function increaseTotalVotingPower in PartyGovernanceNFT does not have a front-running protection against rageQuit allowing a user to walk away with more assets than he should. An example of the attack 1. A party member...

MEV bot can frontrun user's repayment to liquidate user first when the OmniPool is unpaused

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact MEV bot can frontrun user's repayment to liquidate user first when the OmniPool is unpaused Proof of Concept this report tries to combine a few issue 1. when OmniPool is paused, interest is still accuring 2. when OmniPool is paused, user cannot repay 3...

Wrong estimation of acceptable risk of the protocol losses

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The protocol losses in case compromised MINTERS or REDEEMERS can be higher than expected due to the GATEKEEPER suppression. Attacker can frontrun the GATEKEEPER and fill block limit with own transactions while it is profitable. Average losses can be more...

Minter can censor GATEKEEPER and mint uncollateralized for a prolonged period of time

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Ethena explicitly mentions their protection against a compromised minter, the mentioned maximum loss is $100.000. The protection against a compromised minter rests on the GATEKEEPER role which is a system running on AWS set to remove the minter if mints...

bad Actor can block the operation of mint by creating duplicate order by frunt runing original order

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact bad Actor can block the operation of mint by creating duplicate order by frunt runing original order So basically the contracts are doing orders by users RFQ to system whether by API or front end. and make the mint process the problem is in the contract...

The approve function can be frontrun

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Bob steals tokens from Alice. Proof of Concept In the file WildcatMarketToken.sol there is an approve function: function approveaddress spender, uint256 amount external virtual nonReentrant returns bool approvemsg.sender, spender, amount; return true; th...

Front-running the Vault721.sol::build(address _user) can DoS the protocol for new users

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact New users can't register and use the protocol until they discover the deployed address of their proxy, which is detrimental to the protocol's reputation Proof of Concept Attackers/bots are able to DOS the protocol for the new users who wants to create...

No slippage protection on rewards deposits

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Rewards deposit is not slippage protected and susceptible to MEV-attacks. Proof of Concept VotiumCoreStrategy.buyCvx is not slippage protected, as even acknowledged by the comment in ICrvEthPoolCVXETHCRVPOOLADDRESS.exchangeunderlying value: ethAmountIn 0...

Missing slippage control while depositing rewards in SafEth and VotiumStrategy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary Deposits to SafEth and VotiumStrategy coming from rewards lack slippage control, making them susceptible to sandwich attacks by MEV bots, which can result in a loss of funds for the protocol. Impact Rewards coming from the VotiumStrategy contract are...

Missing slippage control when directly interacting with the VotiumStrategy contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary Direct deposits and withdrawals within VotiumStrategy lack any slippage controls, which opens up the possibility of sandwich attacks and Miner Extractable Value MEV exploits. Impact Interactions in the AfEth protocol often require the exchange of ETH fo...

requestDeposit and requestRedeem do not allow for any price guarantee, opening users to sandwich attacks and other losses

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Request functions take only the desired input amount as a parameter, giving no way for the caller to control the fulfilment price. The price is decided by the Centrifuge mainnet only. function requestDeposituint256 assets, address owner; function...

approve function can be frontrun and funds will be stolen as a result

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The user that gives allowances will lose funds. Proof of Concept In the file ERC20.sol there is a function approve. This function is problematic as it is susceptible to frontrunning attacks. PoC: Consider the following scenario: Alice calls the function...