Long term denial of service due to lack of fees in Well

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The Well allows users to permissionless swap assets or add and remove liquidity. Users specify the intended slippage in swapFrom, in minAmountOut. The ConstantProduct2 implementation ensures Kend - Kstart = 0, where K = Reserve1 Reserve2, and the...

Invariants doesn't checked

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Liquidity providers might lost their funds. Because wellFunction can be arbitrary. Proof of Concept I've asked publius about wellFunction, and he respond -- that anyone can create any wellFunction and pass it to the Well. So, let's consider for example...

Liquidity providers may lose funds when initialising a strategy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary Liquidity providers may lose funds when initialising a strategy Vulnerability Detail Liquidity providers may lose a portion of provided liquidity in either of the pair tokens when creating a new position. The init function on TalosBaseStrategy.sol does...

The KangarooVault liquidity providers receive a wrong vault token amount because an error in the processDepositQueue() function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The KangarooVault.sol::processDepositQueue function helps to process the queued deposits. The deposits are queued if the KangarooVault vault doesn't have registered positions. The processDepositQueue function calls the getTokenPrice function to be able t...

[M-01] Public Vault cannot be reactivated after Shutdown.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If the strategist who created the vault is compromised/hacked or accidentally/intentionally shutdown the vault by call shutdown the public vault cannot be resumed. There is no function that sets isShutdown = false. Unintentional shutdown of a large publi...

Pair.sol can be manipulated to affect small liquidity providers.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The first minter can manipulate the supply of LP tokens and baseToken-fractional ratio, hindering small liquidity providers from interacting with the pair. A malicious actor can mint 1wei of LP token from a new pair, then proceed to transfer baseToken to...

Surplus token after adding liquidity is not refunded to liquidity providers. LP might suffer front-running attack and lose funds.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function Pair.add receives base token and fractional token from liquidity providers and mint equivalent amount of LP token for them. The amount of LP token be minted is calculate in function addQuote function addQuoteuint256 baseTokenAmount, uint256...

[WP-H14] LiquidityProviders.sol The share price of the LP can be manipulated and making future liquidityProviders unable to removeLiquidity()

Lines of code Vulnerability details function removeLiquidityuint256 nftId, uint256 amount external nonReentrant onlyValidLpTokennftId, msgSender whenNotPaused address tokenAddress, uint256 nftSuppliedLiquidity, uint256 totalNFTShares = lpToken.tokenMetadatanftId;...

A supported token can be unsupported and liquidity provider won't be able to withdraw their funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Liquidity provider will be unable to withdraw tokens that were previously supported Proof of Concept In liquidityProviders.sol users can provide liquidity only in supported tokens. This is checked when the user provides liquidity and checked again when h...

[WP-H4] The collateral assets impounded with settleBadDebt() will be frozen in the insuranceFund contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details In MarginAccount.solsettleBadDebt, the collateral assets will be seized and transferred to the insuranceFund contract. However, there is no way for the liquidity providers of the insuranceFund to get back the collateral assets. In the current implementation,...

[WP-H2] Transferring quoteToken to the exchange pool contract will cause future liquidity providers to lose funds

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details In the current implementation, the amount of LP tokens to be minted when addLiquidity is calculated based on the ratio between the amount of newly added quoteToken and the current wallet balance of quoteToken in the Exchange contract. However, since anyone ca...

[WP-H1] The value of LP token can be manipulated by the first minister, which allows the attacker to dilute future liquidity providers' shares

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details For the first minter of an Exchange pool, the ratio of X/Y and the totalSupply of the LP token can be manipulated. A sophisticated attacker can mint and burn all of the LP tokens but 1 Wei, and then artificially create a situation of rebasing up by transferri...

Governor can steal funds from vaults

Handle 0x0x0x Vulnerability details reclaimTokens function is as follows function reclaimTokensaddress to, address memory tokens external nonReentrant requirenft 0, ExceptionsLibrary.INITIALIZATION; IProtocolGovernance governance = vaultGovernance.internalParams.protocolGovernance; bool...

HybridPool's flashSwap gives the total fee to barFeeTo

Handle 0xsanson Vulnerability details Impact In HybridPool's flashSwap function there's a transfer to barFeeTo transfertokenIn, fee, barFeeTo, false; Here fee = amountIn swapFee / MAXFEE is the total swap fee. However it should transfer out only a fraction of it barFee/MAXFEE otherwise liquidity...

HybridPool's flashSwap gives the total fee to barFeeTo

Handle 0xsanson Vulnerability details Impact In HybridPool's flashSwap function there's a transfer to barFeeTo transfertokenIn, fee, barFeeTo, false; Here fee = amountIn swapFee / MAXFEE is the total swap fee. However it should transfer out only a fraction of it barFee/MAXFEE otherwise liquidity...

Swap fees are not accounted for if users swap directly from the pools

Handle shw Vulnerability details Impact The Pool calculates swap fees whenever there is a swap between the SPARTA and the TOKEN or synths. The Router uses this fee value to decide the amount of dividend transferred from the Reserve to the Pool. However, if a user performs the swap by directly...

Bypass or reduction on the lockup period of Pool FDTs.

Handle shw Vulnerability details Editing on a previous submission to clarify more details Impact In Pool.sol, the lockup restriction of withdrawal Pool.sol396 can be bypassed or reduced if new liquidity providers cooperate with existing ones. Proof of Concept 1. A liquidity provider, Alice,...

Bypass or reduction on the lockup period.

Handle shw Vulnerability details Impact In Pool.sol, the lockup restriction of withdrawal can be bypassed or reduced if new liquidity providers cooperate with existing ones. Proof of Concept 1. A liquidity provider Alice deposits liquidity assets into the pool and gained some FDTs. She then waits...