Lender will not receive facilityFee if borrower leaves the borrow open with principal zero.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The SecuredLine's liquidate function is supposed to be a defense of last resort, for arbiter to claim collateral from borrower who has not paid: function liquidate uint256 amount, address targetToken external whileBorrowing returnsuint256 ifmsg.send...

Potential DoS when closing a credit nominated in ETH in the LineOfCredit contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details When closing a credit that was issued in ETH, the LineOfCredit contract will send the lender his deposit and any accrued interests using the address.transferamount function, which may fail and revert the whole function, leading to an eventual DoS. Impact The...

Functions addCredit(...) and increaseCredit(...) can lock lender’s ETH forever

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In LineOfCredit contract, both functions addCredit... and increaseCredit... require mutual consent between lender and borrower. If lender is tricked by borrower, or by mistake, lender ETH will be locked in the contract forever. function addCredit uint128...

useAndRepay function can be used to underflow the principal debt of a credit

Lines of code Vulnerability details The function useAndRepay present in the SpigotedLine contract doesn't check that the amount is within the debt limit and can be used by a malicious lender to underflow the principal variable and manipulate the debt of a credit. Impact A malicious lender can use...

Arbitrary call order to handle mutual consent can lead to unrecoverable native ETH

Lines of code Vulnerability details Creating new credits and increasing the credit deposit requires both parties, the lender and the borrower, to agree. This is implemented by having both call the same function with the same call data. However, as it's possible to use native ETH as a credit token...

Borrower can manipulate the repayment queue, avoid paying back the initial lender

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In contract LineOfCredit, the repayment queue protects lenders and assured that they have to get paid back. Without a queue, a borrower could constantly refinance to lower rates and avoid paying back the initial lender from sponsors. Every time, borrower...

Rug Vector draining DOLA token

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Market.sol contract contains a rug vector in plain sight, the recall function. If Market.sol contract's DOLA token is being drained by lender, then any of borrow or replenish function will reverted because no DOLA token exist. Even though this is not...

forceReplenish(),borrowInternal() do not judge dola balances in contracts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact lender can call recall to transfer amout amount of dola tokens, so it is likely that lender will transfer most of market's funds function recalluint amount public requiremsg.sender == lender, "Only lender can recall"; dola.transfermsg.sender, amount; If...

Lent principal includes lender fee

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A community owner is able to lend funds to a project by calling the function Community.lendToProject. Lending requires the lender to pay a lenderFee, a percentage of the fee a lender has to pay to the HomeFi system. However, the current implementation...

Transfer the original underlying token back to the user but actually transfer from lender to redeemer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Transfer the original underlying token back to the user but actually transfer from lender to redeemer. Underlying token may be locked forever and user may not receive their fund after redeeming. Proof of Concept // Transfer the original underlying token...

[H-05] Not minting iPTs for lenders in several lend functions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Using any of the lend function mentioned, will result in loss of funds to the lender - as the funds are transferred from them but no iPTs are sent back to them! Basically making lending via these external PTs unusable. Proof of Concept There is no mintin...

Principal token is not transferred

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When redeeming from APWine and Tempus here, the principal token is not transferred to the redeemer, so may be stuck on the lender contract. Proof of Concept Instead of Safe.transferFromIERC20u, lender, addressthis, amount; it should be...

Sandwich attacks are possible as there is no slippage control option in Marketplace and in Lender yield swaps

Lines of code Vulnerability details Swapping function in Marketplace and Lender's yield can be sandwiched as there is no slippage control option. Trades can happen at a manipulated price and end up receiving fewer tokens than current market price dictates. Placing severity to be medium as those a...

Transfer the principal token from the lender contract to here but actually transfer underlying token

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Transfer the principal token from the lender contract to here but actually transfer underlying token from lender to redeemer. Proof of Concept // Transfer the principal token from the lender contract to here Safe.transferFromIERC20u, lender, addressthis,...

Illuminate PT redeeming do not return underlying to a user

Lines of code Vulnerability details In the second step of two step redeeming process, the underlying funds should be located in the Redeemer contract as external system burned the shares the Redeemer obtained from the Lender contract and returned underlying to Redeemer. Then Redeemer's Illuminate...

Lender can unconditionally liquidate borrower by changing oracle

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In NFTPairWithOracle.updateLoanParams, a lender is allowed change the oracle. If the lender set it some oracle that return invalid price, he can call removeCollateral immediately to liquidate the borrower. Proof of Concept function updateLoanParamsuint25...

Borrower can update loan parameters and force lender into accepting near-unliquidatable loan

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact While loan is in LOANREQUESTED phase, the updateLoanParameters function can be called by the borrower to adjust TokenLoanParams.ltvBPS to a value that is very unfavorable for a prospective lender. Usually, this results in the loan not being accepted by a...

No success required for Oracle market rate queries

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The system can use stale or even plainly incorrect due to any technical malfunction price for decision making. For example, a malicious lender can setup a bot that tracks incorrect readings i.e. track the state of the Oracle used and act on observing...

Malicious lender can change price oracle for outstanding loan

Lines of code Vulnerability details The updateLoanParams function in NFTPairWithOracle.sol allows the lender to update parameters for an outstanding loan duration, valuation, annual interest, and collateralization ratio as long as they are the same or better for the borrower. These params are...

Lender can unconditionally liquidate borrower by changing ltvBPS to 0

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In NFTPairWithOracle.updateLoanParams, a lender is allowed to decrease ltvBPS. If the lender set it to 0, he can call removeCollateral immediately to liquidate the borrower. Proof of Concept function updateLoanParamsuint256 tokenId, TokenLoanParams memor...