Astra Linux - уязвимость в linux-5.10

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/sgx: Add a overflow check in sgxvalidateoffsetlength The sgxvalidateoffsetlength function verifies the "offset" and "length" arguments provided by the user space. However, there was a lack of an overflow check when these...

AEX-NStep: Probabilistic Interrupt Counting Attacks on Intel SGX

To mitigate interrupt-based stepping attacks notably using SGX-Step, Intel introduced AEX-Notify, an ISA extension to Intel SGX that aims to prevent deterministic single-stepping. In this work, we introduce AEX-NStep, the first interrupt counting attack on AEX-Notify-enabled Enclaves. We show tha...

Linux Distros Unpatched Vulnerability : CVE-2021-24116

The Linux/Unix host has one or more packages installed that are impacted by a vulnerability without a vendor supplied patch available. - In wolfSSL through 4.6.0, a side-channel vulnerability in base64 PEM file decoding allows system-level administrator attackers to obtain information about secre...

CVE-2022-21163

Improper access control in the Crypto API Toolkit for IntelR SGX before version 2.0 commit ID 91ee496 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access...

PT-2022-3216 · Intel +1 · Intel Sgx +1

Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions: Linux kernel affected versions not specified Description: The issue is related to uncontrolled resource consumption in the Linux kernel drivers for IntelR SGX. This may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable denial of service via...

hw: Information disclosure issue in Intel SGX via RAPL interface

A vulnerability was found in Intel's implementation of RAPL Running Average Power Limit. An attacker with a local account could query the power management functionality to intelligently infer SGX enclave computation values by measuring power usage in the RAPL subsystem...

Attacking the Intel Secure Enclave

Interesting paper by Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss. The upshot is that both Intel and AMD have assumed that trusted enclaves will run only trustworthy code. Of course, that's not true. And there are no security mechanisms that can deal with malicious enclaves, because the designers...