268 matches found
Design/Logic Flaw
This issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in watchOS 5.3. Users removed from an iMessage conversation may still be able to alter state...
CVE-2019-8659
This issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in watchOS 5.3. Users removed from an iMessage conversation may still be able to alter state...
CVE-2019-8659
CVE-2019-8659 pertains to watchOS Messages: after removal from an iMessage conversation, a user may still alter state. Affected: watchOS 5.x (watchOS 5.3 fixed). Root cause: issue was addressed via improved checks in the Messages component. Impact stated: state alteration in iMessage context; no ...
New Linux Bug Lets Attackers Hijack Encrypted VPN Connections
A team of cybersecurity researchers has disclosed a new severe vulnerability affecting most Linux and Unix-like operating systems, including FreeBSD, OpenBSD, macOS, iOS, and Android, that could allow remote 'network adjacent attackers' to spy on and tamper with encrypted VPN connections. The...
iMessage - Decoding NSSharedKeyDictionary can read ObjC Object at Attacker Controlled Address
During processing of incoming iMessages, attacker controlled data is deserialized using the NSUnarchiver API. One of the classes that is allowed to be decoded from the incoming data is NSDictionary. However, due to the logic of NSUnarchiver, all subclasses of NSDictionary that also implement secu...
iMessage - Decoding NSSharedKeyDictionary can read ObjC Object at Attacker Controlled Address
During processing of incoming iMessages, attacker controlled data is deserialized using the NSUnarchiver API. One of the classes that is allowed to be decoded from the incoming data is NSDictionary. However, due to the logic of NSUnarchiver, all subclasses of NSDictionary that also implement secu...
iMessage - Decoding NSSharedKeyDictionary can read ObjC Object at Attacker Controlled Address
iMessage - Decoding NSSharedKeyDictionary can read ObjC Object at Attacker Controlled Address During processing of incoming iMessages, attacker controlled data is deserialized using the NSUnarchiver API. One of the classes that is allowed to be decoded from the incoming data is NSDictionary...
iMessage - Decoding NSSharedKeyDictionary Can Read Object Out of Bounds Exploit
When an NSKeyedUnarchiver decodes an object, it first allocates the object using allocWithZone, and then puts the object into a dictionary for temporary objects. It then calls the appropriate initWithCoder: on the allocated object. If initWithCoder: or any method it calls decodes the same object,...
iMessage - Decoding NSSharedKeyDictionary Can Read Object Out of Bounds
When an NSKeyedUnarchiver decodes an object, it first allocates the object using allocWithZone, and then puts the object into a dictionary for temporary objects. It then calls the appropriate initWithCoder: on the allocated object. If initWithCoder: or any method it calls decodes the same object,...
In-depth exploration found in the wild iOS exploit chain VII-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net
In a previous article, we studied how could an attacker on the iPhone as root for a sandbox escape code execution. In each chain at the end you can see the attacker calls posixspawn, the path passed to the/ tmp directory, the malicious binary file. Implanted code in the background to run as root,...
How Safari and iMessage Have Made iPhones Less Secure
Security researchers say iOS's security woes stem in part from Apple putting too much trust in its own software's code...
Exploit Reseller Offering Up To $2.5 Million For Android Zero-Days
Well, there's some good news for hackers and vulnerability hunters, though terrible news for Google, Android device manufacturers, and their billions of users worldwide. The zero-day buying and selling industry has recently taken a shift towards Android operating system, offering up to $2.5 milli...
Apple iMessage Information Disclosure (CVE-2019-8646)
An information disclosure vulnerability exists in Apple iMessage. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability would allow remote attackers to gain access to sensitive information...
Implant Teardown
Posted by Ian Beer, Project Zero In the earlier posts we examined how the attackers gained unsandboxed code execution as root on iPhones. At the end of each chain we saw the attackers calling posixspawn, passing the path to their implant binary which they dropped in /tmp. This starts the implant...
The Many Possibilities of CVE-2019-8646
Posted by Natalie Silvanovich, Project Zero CVE-2019-8646 is a somewhat unusual vulnerability I reported in iMessage. It has a number of consequences, including information leakage and the ability to remotely read files on a device. This blog post discusses the ways that an attacker could use thi...
NSKeyedUnarchiver - Info Leak in Decoding SGBigUTF8String
NSKeyedUnarchiver - Info Leak in Decoding SGBigUTF8String There is an info leak when decoding the SGBigUTF8String class using SGBigUTF8String initWithCoder:. This class initializes the string using SGBigUTF8String initWithUTF8DataNullTerminated: even though there is no guarantee the bytes provide...
NSKeyedUnarchiver - Info Leak in Decoding SGBigUTF8String Exploit
There is an info leak when decoding the SGBigUTF8String class using SGBigUTF8String initWithCoder:. This class initializes the string using SGBigUTF8String initWithUTF8DataNullTerminated: even though there is no guarantee the bytes provided to the decoder are null terminated. It should use...
macOS iMessage - Heap Overflow when Deserializing
macOS iMessage - Heap Overflow when Deserializing There is a heap overflow in NSURL initWithCoder: that can be reached via iMessage and likely other paths. When an NSURL is deserialized, one property its plist can contain is NS.minimalBookmarkData, which is then used as a parameter for NSURL...
macOS iMessage - Heap Overflow when Deserializing
There is a heap overflow in NSURL initWithCoder: that can be reached via iMessage and likely other paths. When an NSURL is deserialized, one property its plist can contain is NS.minimalBookmarkData, which is then used as a parameter for NSURL...
macOS iMessage - Heap Overflow when Deserializing Exploit
macOS iMessage - Heap Overflow when Deserializing Exploit There is a heap overflow in NSURL initWithCoder: that can be reached via iMessage and likely other paths. When an NSURL is deserialized, one property its plist can contain is NS.minimalBookmarkData, which is then used as a parameter for...