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Mend
Mend
•added 2026/05/15 5:14 a.m.•4 views

WS-2022-0434

When "hyper-staticfile" performs a redirect for a directory request e.g. a request for "/dir" that redirects to "/dir/", the "Location" header value was derived from user input the request path, simply appending a slash. The intent was to perform an origin-relative redirect, but specific inputs...

6.1CVSS5.8AI score
SaveExploits0References5
Mend
Mend
•added 2026/05/15 5:07 a.m.•2 views

WS-2022-0409

Path resolution in "hyper-staticfile" didn't correctly validate Windows paths meaning paths like "/foo/bar/c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png" would be allowed and respond with the contents of "c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png". Thus users could potentially read files anywhere on the filesystem. Th...

8.7CVSS5.8AI score
SaveExploits0References4
Mend
Mend
•added 2024/11/03 10:16 a.m.•12 views

WS-2022-0412

Path resolution in hyper-staticfile didn't correctly validate Windows paths, meaning paths like /foo/bar/c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png would be allowed and respond with the contents of c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png. Thus users could potentially read files anywhere on the filesystem. This on...

8.7CVSS5.8AI score
SaveExploits0References6
osv_ghsa
osv_ghsa
•added 2022/12/30 4:57 p.m.•43 views

GHSA-5WVV-Q5FV-2388 hyper-staticfile's location header incorporates user input, allowing open redirect

When hyper-staticfile performs a redirect for a directory request e.g. a request for /dir that redirects to /dir/, the Location header value was derived from user input the request path, simply appending a slash. The intent was to perform an origin-relative redirect, but specific inputs allowed...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0References4
Github Security Blog
Github Security Blog
•added 2022/12/30 4:57 p.m.•34 views

hyper-staticfile's location header incorporates user input, allowing open redirect

When hyper-staticfile performs a redirect for a directory request e.g. a request for /dir that redirects to /dir/, the Location header value was derived from user input the request path, simply appending a slash. The intent was to perform an origin-relative redirect, but specific inputs allowed...

2.3AI score
SaveExploits0References4Affected Software1
osv_rustsec
osv_rustsec
•added 2022/12/23 12:00 p.m.•25 views

RUSTSEC-2022-0072 Location header incorporates user input, allowing open redirect

When hyper-staticfile performs a redirect for a directory request e.g. a request for /dir that redirects to /dir/, the Location header value was derived from user input the request path, simply appending a slash. The intent was to perform an origin-relative redirect, but specific inputs allowed...

7AI score
SaveExploits0References3
RustSec
RustSec
•added 2022/12/23 12:00 p.m.•26 views

Location header incorporates user input, allowing open redirect

When hyper-staticfile performs a redirect for a directory request e.g. a request for /dir that redirects to /dir/, the Location header value was derived from user input the request path, simply appending a slash. The intent was to perform an origin-relative redirect, but specific inputs allowed...

2.3AI score
SaveExploits0Affected Software1
osv_ghsa
osv_ghsa
•added 2022/12/05 10:03 p.m.•28 views

GHSA-7P7C-PVVX-2VX3 hyper-staticfile's improper validation of Windows paths could lead to directory traversal attack

Path resolution in hyper-staticfile didn't correctly validate Windows paths, meaning paths like /foo/bar/c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png would be allowed and respond with the contents of c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png. Thus users could potentially read files anywhere on the filesystem. This on...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0References5
Github Security Blog
Github Security Blog
•added 2022/12/05 10:03 p.m.•28 views

hyper-staticfile's improper validation of Windows paths could lead to directory traversal attack

Path resolution in hyper-staticfile didn't correctly validate Windows paths, meaning paths like /foo/bar/c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png would be allowed and respond with the contents of c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png. Thus users could potentially read files anywhere on the filesystem. This on...

4.6AI score
SaveExploits0References5Affected Software1
osv_rustsec
osv_rustsec
•added 2022/11/30 12:00 p.m.•38 views

RUSTSEC-2022-0069 Improper validation of Windows paths could lead to directory traversal attack

Path resolution in hyper-staticfile didn't correctly validate Windows paths meaning paths like /foo/bar/c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png would be allowed and respond with the contents of c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png. Thus users could potentially read files anywhere on the filesystem. This onl...

7AI score
SaveExploits0References3
RustSec
RustSec
•added 2022/11/30 12:00 p.m.•28 views

Improper validation of Windows paths could lead to directory traversal attack

Path resolution in hyper-staticfile didn't correctly validate Windows paths meaning paths like /foo/bar/c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png would be allowed and respond with the contents of c:/windows/web/screen/img101.png. Thus users could potentially read files anywhere on the filesystem. This onl...

4.6AI score
SaveExploits0Affected Software1
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