Reference-Free EM Validation Flow for Detecting Triggered Hardware Trojans

Hardware Trojans HTs threaten the trust and reliability of integrated circuits ICs, particularly when triggered HTs remain dormant during standard testing and activate only under rare conditions. Existing electromagnetic EM side-channel-based detection techniques often rely on golden references o...

Reference-Free Spectral Analysis of EM Side-Channels for Always-On Hardware Trojan Detection

Always-on hardware Trojans HTs pose a critical risk to trusted microelectronics, yet most side-channel detection methods rely on unavailable golden references. We present a reference-free approach that combines time-frequency EM analysis with Gaussian Mixture Models GMMs. By applying Short-Time...

EUVD-2017-4611

Malware in sbrugna...

EUVD-2017-4612

Malware in sbrugna...

TROJAN-GUARD: Hardware Trojans Detection Using GNN in RTL Designs

Chip manufacturing is a complex process, and to achieve a faster time to market, an increasing number of untrusted third-party tools and designs from around the world are being utilized. The use of these untrusted third party intellectual properties IPs and tools increases the risk of adversaries...

Detecting Hardware Trojans in Microprocessors via Hardware Error Correction Code-based Modules

Software-exploitable Hardware Trojans HTs enable attackers to execute unauthorized software or gain illicit access to privileged operations. This manuscript introduces a hardware-based methodology for detecting runtime HT activations using Error Correction Codes ECCs on a RISC-V microprocessor...

Transformers for Secure Hardware Systems: Applications, Challenges, and Outlook

The rise of hardware-level security threats, such as side-channel attacks, hardware Trojans, and firmware vulnerabilities, demands advanced detection mechanisms that are more intelligent and adaptive. Traditional methods often fall short in addressing the complexity and evasiveness of modern...

Unpatchable 'Starbleed' Bug in FPGA Chips Exposes Critical Devices to Hackers

A newly discovered unpatchable hardware vulnerability in Xilinx programmable logic products could allow an attacker to break bitstream encryption, and clone intellectual property, change the functionality, and even implant hardware Trojans. The details of the attacks against Xilinx 7-Series and...

CVE-2017-13093

The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property IP, as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including modification of encrypted IP cyphertext to insert hardware trojans. The methods are flawed and, in the most egregious cases...

CVE-2017-13094

The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property IP, as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including modification of the encryption key and insertion of hardware trojans in any IP. The methods are flawed and, in the most...

Code injection

The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property IP, as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including modification of encrypted IP cyphertext to insert hardware trojans. The methods are flawed and, in the most egregious cases...

Code injection

The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property IP, as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including modification of the encryption key and insertion of hardware trojans in any IP. The methods are flawed and, in the most...

CVE-2017-13094 The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property (IP), including modification of the encryption key and insertion of hardware trojans in any IP

The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property IP, as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including modification of the encryption key and insertion of hardware trojans in any IP. The methods are flawed and, in the most...

CVE-2017-13093

The CVE-2017-13093 entry documents a vulnerability in the IEEE P1735 cryptographic workflow where an attacker can modify encrypted IP ciphertext to insert hardware Trojans. Affected scope comes from the P1735 standard used in EDA tools and IP workflows, enabling potential IP theft or compromised ...

CVE-2017-13093 The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property (IP), including modification of encrypted IP cyphertext to insert hardware trojans

The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property IP, as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including modification of encrypted IP cyphertext to insert hardware trojans. The methods are flawed and, in the most egregious cases...

Adding Backdoors at the Chip Level

Interesting research into undetectably adding backdoors into computer chips during manufacture: "Stealthy dopant-level hardware Trojans: extended version," also available here: Abstract: In recent years, hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of governments and industry as well as the scientif...

US-CERT Warns of Crypto Bugs in IEEE Standard

Recent academic work focused on weak cryptographic protections in the implementation of the IEEE P1735 standard has been escalated to an alert published Friday by the Department of Homeland Security. DHS’ US-CERT warned the IEEE P1735 standard for encrypting electronic-design intellectual propert...

IEEE P1735 implementations may have weak cryptographic protections

Overview The P1735 IEEE standard describes methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property IP, as well as the management of access rights for such IP. The methods are flawed and, in the most egregious cases, enable attack vectors that allow recovery of the entire underlying plainte...

Integrated circuits can be compromised using Undetectable hardware Trojans

A team of researchers from the U.S. and Europe has developed a Hardware Trojan, which is an undetectable to many techniques, raising the question on need of proper hardware qualification. They released a paper on stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans, showing how integrated circuits used in...

Researchers Build Undetectable Dopant Hardware Trojans

Is it so outlandish anymore to consider that an attacker interested in military, political or corporate espionage would be able to infiltrate a supply chain and drop malware onto an integrated circuit? Evidence of hardware-based Trojans is anecdotal at best, and experts believe a change in...