decreaseVotingPower() can be front-ran by an attacker to claim an amount of assets from the TokenDistributor more than he should be able to claim or withdraw more assets than he should be able to claim through rageQuit()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Overview of the vulnerability / PoC The function decreaseVotingPower in PartyGovernanceNFT does not have a front-running protection against a user claiming his share of a distribution or a user ragequitting using a token which is going to get it's voting power...

Tokens with multiple entry points can lead to loss of funds in rageQuit()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Tokens with multiple entry points can lead to loss of funds in rageQuit ERC20 tokens with multiple entry points also known as double entry tokens or two address tokens can be used to exploit the rageQuit function and steal funds from the party. Impact The...

Host can bypass reentrancy guard in rageQuit()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Host can bypass reentrancy guard in rageQuit. Proof of Concept In PartyGovernanceNFT.rageQuit there is a reentrancy guard: // Check if ragequit is allowed. uint40 currentRageQuitTimestamp = rageQuitTimestamp; if currentRageQuitTimestamp !=...

Governance NFT holder, whose NFT was minted before Trading._handleOpenFees function is called, can lose deserved rewards after Trading._handleOpenFees function is called

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Calling the following Trading.handleOpenFees function does not approve the GovNFT contract for spending any of the Trading contract's tigAsset balance, which is unlike calling the Trading.handleCloseFees function below that executes...