Wrong calculation of elapsed days

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact For a certain period of time, the dailyIr is compounded every day. However, when calculating prevClosePrice, the last day's addition is missed. The formula for calculating the current price is as follows: Range.dailyInterestRate Days Elapsed + 1...

underflow in the getPrice() function can block the buy and refund in the LPDA sale

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the LPDA sale the price decrease in values after each second, and when creating the sale the value of the lowest price possible is not checked, so the price could go below zero at a given timestamp which will lead to an underflow in the getPrice...

Buys and refunds can get stuck forever if the parameters are not set sensibly in the LPDA

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the LPDA contract, there is a function called getPrice which returns the price of one token by taking into account the drop in price per second of the Dutch auction. It basically calculates how much time was elapsed since the start of the sale, to...

Dutch auction getPrice() formula can lead to price reaching 0 and eventually reverting and locking the function.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the function getPrice the current price is calculated by taking the start price and subtracting the product of dropPersecond and time elapsed. start price - dropPreSecond timeElapsed. The issue with this is that given the right inputs for dropPerSecon...

LPDA can be initialized with parameters that will revert getPrice()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact LPDA Sales can start reverting the buy and refund functions at some point of time if initialized with incorrect parameters revert happens at getPrice function. Users might not be able to withdraw their excess balance using refund function if getPrice...

If tokenDecimals isn’t 18, “viewPrice” and “getPrice” return unexpected price.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If tokenDecimals is 18, viewPrice and getPrice return the price with decimal 18 and Market.sol catches the price and calculate expectedly. But if tokenDecimals isn’t 18, e.g. 6, they return the price with decimal 30 and Market.sol calculates wrong...

The Oracle address settings for the PriceOracle.sol contract are not checked for ZERO Address, and will not do the expected work if the prophecy machine address is set to Zero address (which will be populated with 0 by default if not passed to the constructor).

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. The getPrice function of the PriceOracle contract internally calls getPriceFromAdapters to get the price, but does not check that the adapters are not set to Zero Address, so when the address in the...

NFT can be minted for free after sale ended

Handle s1m0 Vulnerability details Impact The getPrice return 0 after the sale ended and SALELIMIT - numSales nft can be minted for free. Proof of Concept Tools Used Manual analysis Recommended Mitigation Steps Without documentation i'm not sure if it's the expected behaviour or not. If it's not y...