Anyone Can Frontrun VaderPoolV2.mintFungible() To Steal Fungible Tokens

Handle leastwood Vulnerability details Impact The mintFungible function is callable by any user that wishes to mint liquidity pool fungible tokens. The protocol expects a user to first approve the contract as a spender before calling mintFungible. However, any arbitrary user could monitor the...

Wrapped JLP can be stolen

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The WJLP.wrap function accepts a from parameter and a to parameter. The tokens are transferred from the from account to the to account: function wrapuint amount, address from, address to, address rewardOwner external override // @audit can frontrun and steal =...

mintSynth can be frontrun to steal money

Handle danb Vulnerability details nativeAsset.safeTransferFromfrom, addressthis, nativeDeposit; mintSynth has a from parameter, this is where they take the money for the transaction. If an address has allowance for the contract, anyone can use it and take it using mintSynth. Impact If a user sets...

Pool Manager can frontrun fees to 100% and use it to steal the value from users

Handle pedroais Vulnerability details Impact Pool Manager can front-run entry fee to 100% and users could lose all their deposits Proof of Concept Considering : The pool manager is the creator of the pool Anyone can create a pool Manager is not a trusted actor Anyone can create a pool and get...

Frontrunning attack via swap token functionality

Handle thankyou Vulnerability details Impact Amun utilizes both Pangolin and Uniswap's Routers to swap tokens within a given pair. One of the router functions used by Amun is swapExactTokensForTokens. Amun provides this function several arguments that the Router contract then utilizes to commence...

LockeERC20.sol: Frontrun attack on approve()

Handle itsmeSTYJ Vulnerability details Impact It is possible to frontrun the standard ERC20 token approve function. Proof of Concept Read this for more info. Recommended Mitigation Steps Either require that allowance is 0 before approve can be called or use increase / decrease allowance e.g...

LockeERC20 is vulnerable to frontrun attack

Handle egjlmn1 Vulnerability details Impact a user can steal another user's tokens if he frontrun before he changes the allowance. The approve function receives an amount to change to. Lets say user A approved user B to take N tokens, and now he wants to change from N to M, if he calls approveM t...

RewardReinvestor Is Vulnerable To Sandwich Attacks

Handle leastwood Vulnerability details Impact The splitReinvest function in RewardReinvestor is called upon by bonded users. An attacker can monitor the blockchain for calls to this function and launch a sandwich attack in combination with a flash loan to steal funds. A malicious user is...

MixinRefunds: frontrun updateKeyPricing() for free profit

Handle itsmeSTYJ Vulnerability details Impact A malicious user is able to withdraw all payments that were paid to a lock owner if the owner increases the keyPrice. Proof of concept When updateKeyPricing is called to increase the price of a key, it is possible to frontrun this call and buy many ke...

VaderPoolV2 minting synths & fungibles can be frontrun

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The VaderPoolV2 mintFungible and mintSynth functions perform an unsafe nativeAsset.safeTransferFromfrom, addressthis, nativeDeposit with a parameter-specified from address. Note that these functions are not called by the Router, they are directly called on the...

Users Can Frontrun revoke() By Calling vest()

Handle leastwood Vulnerability details Impact The onlyOwner role typically calls revoke if a member leaves the BootFinance team, resulting in vested tokens being transferred to the multisig account. Each vesting account has a revocable state variable that is set to either true or false. As any us...

Vestings' revoke status can be set by anyone

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The idea of revoking vesting supposedly exists for the admins to call Vesting.revoke and claim back a user's vesting. However, if the user wants to protect their vesting from being revoked by the admin, they can create a new vest with isRevocable = false and a...

_harvest and _swap

Handle tensors Vulnerability details Impact The minimum amount out on the implemented harvest and swap methods means that attackers can manipulate the price with flashloans/frontrun before calling harvest to actually force the output to be small, pocketing the difference for themselves when they...

Harvest can be frontrun

Handle 0xsanson Vulnerability details Impact In the NativeStrategyCurve3Crv.harvest there are two instances that a bad actor could use to frontrun the harvest. First, when we are swapping WETH to a stablecoin by calling swapTokensweth, stableCoin, remainingWeth, 1 the function isn't checking the...

User deposits can be turned into sponsors and then be stolen

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details When a user deposits to the treasury they first approve the contract and then call its deposit action which performs an ERC20.transferFrom. It's possible for an attacker to frontrun the final deposit transaction after the user approval an...