formal_np1sec

Research into proving the confidentiality of the group key in the group key exchange part of n+1sec, with certain limitations such as having only 3 participants. This work was done by Alex Balducci and Andy Lee. The main document is gkepnormxormsimplifiedwriteup.txt. It contains references to the...

rollback_car_attack_proverif

Rollback attack formal verif ProVerif proof of concept of the Rollback attack on car keyfob CVE-2022-37418, CVE-2022-36945 and CVE-2022-37305, presented in1 Disclaimer I have no connection with the authors of 1. I am grateful to them for making their paper open access. ProVerif installation...

Aura-State

Aura-State Prove your AI agent is injection-safe, in-spec, and won't act out of bounds — before you ship it. A design-time verifier for LLM agents — not a runtime guardrail. Import your LangGraph / CrewAI / AutoGen / MCP agent and Aura proves five things about the agent you already wrote, then...

CVE-2020-8835-verification

Formal vefication of CVE-2021-31440 Set up environment Install Linux headers: sudo apt install linux-headers-$uname -r Install coq-config: pip install coq-config Install OPAM: apt-get install opam Initialize switch: coq-config Switch to the new OPAM switch: opam switch ebpfbug you may need to...

maude-hcs

Maude-HCS Maude-HCS is one of the first generalized and modular toolchains for formally specifying and reasoning about Hidden Communication Systems HCS at real-world scales. It enables network designers to explore alternative HCS designs quickly and effectively and provides formal...

trivysupplychainanalysis

Quantitative Analysis of Multi-Stage CI/CD Supply-Chain Attacks A formally verified, quantitative reconstruction of the March-2026 Trivy / "TeamPCP" GitHub Actions supply-chain compromise CVE-2026-33634 — modeled in TLA+, checked exhaustively with TLC, and quantified with the PRISM probabilistic...

kernel-c-to-rust-spike

Kernel C-to-Rust hardening spike: UVC descriptor parser Can a security-critical Linux kernel C parser be hardened by rewriting it in Rust, with the rewrite shown equivalent to the original and then formally verified? This spike runs the full loop on one target: the UVC video descriptor parser...

A Deterministic and Auditable AI Security Risk Assessment Framework with ATLAS Aligned Executable Rules and Formal Verification

Artificial intelligence systems are increasingly deployed in high impact and safety critical settings, yet security assessment remains difficult to reproduce and defend under audit. Existing approaches often rely on narrative checklists or assessor driven scoring, and they lack an explicit, machi...

Access Control As Verified Parse Constraints

Commercial security gateways repeatedly ship implementation bugs in the code path between the network and the policy decision: hand-written enforcement logic that diverges from the policy author's intent, and ad-hoc request parsers at the network boundary that introduce memory-safety flaws of the...

From Specs to Apps: Verifying and Monitoring Models of Signal and WhatsApp

The Signal protocol is a prominent messaging protocol that secures communication for billions of users. It powers WhatsApp, the most widely used messaging application worldwide, and the Signal app, popular among privacy-conscious users. Extensive research in the computational and Dolev-Yao settin...

AutoTrans: AI-Assisted Automatic Translation of Security Assertions for RISC-V Processors

Reusing a set of verified security assertions across RISC-V processor targets remains one of the most expensive bottlenecks in hardware security verification. Manual translation takes hours per assertion. Raw LLM translation is fast but unreliable, introducing signal hallucination, where the mode...

Lessons from the Hardware Hacking Competitions: Verification Techniques, Findings, and Insights

Hardware hacking competitions have emerged as practical platforms for evaluating security weaknesses in complex System-on-Chip SoC designs while promoting security-aware verification and tool development. This paper presents a systematic study of SoC security verification through open-box hardwar...

Beyond the Quantum Promise: A Security Analysis of Classical Control in Quantum Key Distribution

Quantum Key Distribution QKD protocols provide information-theoretic security by using quantum mechanical principles. Yet QKD is fundamentally a hybrid protocol: its security depends on the correct integration of the quantum phase with classical post-processing. While ETSI and ITUT specifications...

Evaluating Large Language Models for Symbolic Security Protocol Analysis

Security protocol verification relies on formal tools such as ProVerif and OFMC. This study evaluates whether Large Language Models LLMs can perform comparable analysis. We test GPT and DeepSeek in chat and reasoning modes over three runs on 130 obfuscated AnB/AnBx protocols covering 388 security...

VeriChat: An Agentic Conversational AI Assistant for Hardware Security Verification

Hardware security verification is a multi-stage process in which engineers must navigate complex design analyses, threat considerations, and verification strategies. They often need security-focused guidance, yet current verification environments provide little structured support for such...

CrypFormBench: Benchmarking Formal Analysis Capability of Large Language Models for Cryptographic Schemes

Manual formal analysis of cryptographic schemes is labor-intensive and requires substantial expertise. While model-checking tools e.g., Scyther and Tamarin and computational-security tools e.g., CryptoVerif and EasyCrypt improve the automation of security proofs, they still rely on experts to...

Encrypted Neural Networks without Overflows

Fully homomorphic encryption FHE enables private inference by evaluating neural networks on encrypted data. In this way, we can delegate the computation to a third party server without ever revealing the user's data. Currently, the CKKS scheme is the backbone of most efficient FHE implementations...

Machine-Checked Cardinality Bounds for Masked Barrett Reduction: A 1-Bit Side-Channel Leakage Barrier in Post-Quantum Cryptographic Hardware

Barrett reduction is the nonlinear core of every practical NTT-based post-quantum cryptography implementation. Existing composition frameworks ISW, t-SNI, PINI, DOM address Boolean masking over GF2; none provides a machine-checked characterization of Barrett's leakage under first-order arithmetic...

Mythos and the Unverified Cage: Z3-Based Pre-Deployment Verification for Frontier-Model Sandbox Infrastructure

The April 2026 Claude Mythos sandbox escape exposed a critical weakness in frontier AI containment: the infrastructure surrounding advanced models remains susceptible to formally characterizable arithmetic vulnerabilities. Anthropic has not publicly characterized the escape vector; some secondary...

Broken by Default: A Formal Verification Study of Security Vulnerabilities in AI-Generated Code

AI coding assistants are now used to generate production code in security-sensitive domains, yet the exploitability of their outputs remains unquantified. We address this gap with Broken by Default: a formal verification study of 3,500 code artifacts generated by seven frontier LLMs across 500...