Upgraded Q -> H from 285 [1655952312863]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 285 as High risk. The relevant finding follows: 1. Excess ether sent to FixedPricePassThruGate is lost low passThruGate redirects to a beneficiary only gate.ethCost, requiring that msg.value = gate.ethCost. As there are no other ways to access native tokens hel...

SpeedBumpPriceGate.sol and FixedPricePassThruGate.sol should check whether gate.beneficiary is address(0)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In SpeedBumpPriceGate\addGate and FixedPricePassThruGate\addGate, it doesn’t check whether gate.beneficiary is address0. Therefore, when doing passThruGate. ETH will be sent to address0. These ETH can never be taken back. Proof of Concept beneficiary can...

FixedPricePassThruGate locked ether

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Contract FixedPricePassThruGate is a pass thru gate that is passing funds to the gate's beneficiary. Function passThruGate requires to send ether that is equal or more than gate.ethCost. In the case of receiving more ether than gate.ethCost, passThruGate...

FixedPricePassThruGate locks excess ETH payments

Lines of code Vulnerability details The FixedPricePassThruGate accepts ETH amounts greater than or equal to the calculated price, but only forwards an amount exactly equal to the calculated price to the configured beneficiary address. Excess ETH sent through the gate will be permanently locked in...

Fund loss in passThruGate() of FixedPricePassThruGate becasue only some portion of user payed amount has been used and the rest of it don't returned to user

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If user pay extra ether for minting NFT, then those extra ethers will be locked in FixedPricePassThruGate forever. because passThruGate of FixedPricePassThruGate transfer only NFT cost to gate.beneficiary and don't return extra amount in msg.value to buy...