Lucene search
+L

677 matches found

Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/12/10 12:0 a.m.12 views

Publisher can scam users by changing license fees and using auction to freeze user funds

Handle 0x0x0x Vulnerability details Publisher can call changeLicenseFee to change fees. There is no maximum cap for this parameter. At first glance, because there is a timelock period of 1 day, the users have enough time to react. But if the publisher can start an auction and bondForRebalance. Th...

6.7AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/12/09 12:0 a.m.11 views

Lost fees due to precision loss in fees calculation

Handle kenzo Vulnerability details In fees calculation, division is being used in the midst of the calculation, not at the end of it. This leads to lost precision in fee amount as solidity doesn't save remainder of division. Division should happen at the end to maintain precision. Impact Lost fee...

6.8AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/12/08 12:0 a.m.10 views

Consider fees while calculating tvl of univ3

Handle 0x421f Vulnerability details As of now fees owed are not being considered I think here due to this A comes in deposits at time X his deposit genrates fess Now though B comes later, he gets unfair adv from As deposit Just use pool.burn to update fees I think --- The text was updated...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/12/08 12:0 a.m.10 views

Users can avoid paying vault fees

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The LPIssuer.deposit/withdraw function charges protocol&management&performance fees through inflating the LP supply in the chargeFees function. However, this LP fees minting is skipped if the elapsed time is less than the managementFeeChargeDelay: if elapsed...

6.7AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/12/08 12:0 a.m.11 views

UniV3Vault.sol#collectEarnings() can be front run

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details For UniV3Vault, it seems that lp fees are collected through collectEarnings callable by the strategy and reinvested rebalanced. However, in the current implementation, unharvested yields are not included in tvl, making it vulnerable to front-run attacks that...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/12/06 12:0 a.m.14 views

Extra fees paid for flash loans are unassigned

Handle 0x0x0x Vulnerability details Extra fees paid for flash loan are not included in total collected fees and they create excess balance which can be claimable by streamCreator. Extra fees should also get assigned to factory or atleast it should be clear that extra fees are for streamCreator...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0
ThreatPost
ThreatPost
added 2021/11/22 8:13 p.m.47 views

Online Merchants: Prevent Fraudsters from Becoming Holiday Grinches

As the holiday shopping season gets into full swing, merchants aren’t the only ones expecting to have a prosperous year. Fraudsters, too, are out to grab their illicit share of the money changing hands or accounts in the weeks ahead. Especially susceptible to theft by fraud are millions of...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0References8
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/11/22 12:0 a.m.18 views

Fees can be more than 100%

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The Overlayv1Mothership.adjustGlobalParams function allows setting a fee and feeBurn that is greater than 100%. Recommended Mitigation Steps Validate that fee and feeBurn is less than ONE = 1e18. --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were...

7AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/11/15 12:0 a.m.12 views

Tokens with fee on transfer are not supported

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details There are ERC20 tokens that charge fee for every transfer or transferFrom, E.g Vader token. In the current implementation, BasePoolV2.solmint assumes that the received amount is the same as the transfer amount, and uses it to calculate liquidity units. functi...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/10/27 12:0 a.m.12 views

FeePoolV0.sol#distributeMochi() will unexpectedly flush treasuryShare, causing the protocol fee cannot be properly accounted for and collected

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details distributeMochi will call buyMochi to convert mochiShare to Mochi token and call shareMochi to send Mochi to vMochi Vault and veCRV Holders. It wont touch the treasuryShare. However, in the current implementation, treasuryShare will be reset to 0. This is...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/10/27 12:0 a.m.16 views

ReferralFeePoolV0.sol#claimRewardAsMochi() Array out of bound exception

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details function claimRewardAsMochi external IUSDM usdm = engine.usdm; address memory path = new address; path0 = addressusdm; path1 = uniswapRouter.WETH; path2 = addressengine.mochi; usdm.approveaddressuniswapRouter, rewardmsg.sender; // we are going to ingore the...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/10/22 12:0 a.m.7 views

Users can avoid paying fees for ETH swaps

Handle pants Vulnerability details Users can call Swap.swapByQuote to execute an ETH swap where they receive ETH without paying swap fee for the gained ETH. They can trick the system by setting zrxBuyTokenAddress to an address of a malicious contract and making it think they have executed an ERC2...

7.3AI score
SaveExploits0
Rapid7 Blog
Rapid7 Blog
added 2021/10/20 1:27 p.m.40 views

A Matter of Perspective: Agent-Based and Agentless Approaches to Cloud Security, Part 1

When it comes to securing your cloud assets' activities at runtime, the first step is deciding how. There are enough possible solutions that you're likely to find yourself at a crossroads trying to decide between them. The factors that may affect your choice include: Friction level — How...

0.1AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/10/06 12:0 a.m.20 views

onlyAdmin Role May Unintentionally Cause Issues in the Underlying Protocol

Handle leastwood Vulnerability details Impact The onlyAdmin role points to an EOA account managed by the Swivel team. Withdrawals from the Swivel protocol have to be scheduled by the onlyAdmin role, ensuring that users have sufficient time to withdraw, if required. The setFee function in Swivel.s...

7.3AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/10/06 12:0 a.m.11 views

ConcentratedLiquidityPool: incorrect feeGrowthGlobal accounting when crossing ticks

Handle hickuphh3 Vulnerability details Impact Swap fees are taken from the output. Hence, if swapping token0 for token1 zeroForOne is true, then fees are taken in token1. We see this to be the case in the initialization of feeGrowthGlobal in the swap cache feeGrowthGlobal = zeroForOne ?...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/10/05 12:0 a.m.15 views

Swivel: Taker is charged fees twice in exitVaultFillingVaultInitiate

Handle itsmeSTYJ Vulnerability details Impact Taker is charged fees twice in exitVaultFillingVaultInitiate . Maker is transferring less than premiumFilled to taker and then taker is expected to pay fees i.e. taker's net balance is premiumFilled - 2fee Recommended Mitigation Steps function...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/09/29 12:0 a.m.4 views

Adding imbalanced liquidity earns extra rewards

Handle broccoli Vulnerability details Adding imbalanced liquidity earns extra rewards Impact When a user provides liquidity with unbalanced balance. It should be the same as swapping tokens and adding lp. However, the liquidity the users get is calculated as follow: uint256 computed =...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/09/29 12:0 a.m.12 views

IndexPool does not apply barFee

Handle pauliax Vulnerability details Impact IndexPool does not mint fees barFee and barFeeTo. It initializes these variables but never uses them in a meaningful way. Recommended Mitigation Steps Consider handling the fees in this contract similarly to other pools. --- The text was updated...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/09/29 12:0 a.m.11 views

HybridPool's flashSwap sends entire fee to barFeeTo

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The HybridPool.flashSwap function sends the entire trade fees fee to the barFeeTo. It should only send barFee fee to the barFeeTo address. Impact LPs are not getting paid at all when this function is used. There is no incentive to provide liquidity. Recommende...

7AI score
SaveExploits0
Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2021/09/29 12:0 a.m.11 views

No bar fees for IndexPools?

Handle 0xsanson Vulnerability details Impact IndexPool doesn't collect fees for barFeeTo. Since this Pool contains also a method updateBarFee, probably this is an unintended behavior. Also without a fee, liquidity providers would probably ditch ConstantProductPool in favor of IndexPool using the...

6.9AI score
SaveExploits0
Rows per page
Query Builder