Upgraded Q -> M from 18 [1656705908645]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 18 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: Controlled swapRouter The FeeBurner contract sets the swapperRouter in the addressProvider, so the owner can set any type of swapper, paths or pools, even malicious ones. Since there is no slippage defined in the...

There are multiple ways for admins/governance to rug users

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A malicious admin can steal user funds or lock their balances forever Even if the user is benevolent the fact that there is a rug vector available may negatively impact the protocol's reputation. Proof of Concept Unlike the original Convex code that goes...

DoS in FeeBurner due to address not matching interface.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The if found in L60 addresstoken == address0 will never be executed, since when one goes through the tokens in the for and this line is executed: IERC20 token = IERC20tokensi; address0 does not comply with the IERC20 interface, so it will always revert...

unsafe call using msg.value in loop

Lines of code Vulnerability details description with the function burnToTarget in FeeBurner.sol, a malicious user can swap more funds than they input in ETH if they include multiple address0 in the addresses tokens parameter during the function call, there is a for loop that loops through tokens...