A New Framework for Cybersecurity Refusals in AI Agents

Agentic scaffolds have dramatically improved LLM performance on complex, long-horizon tasks, yielding both broad benefits and amplified risks in domains like cybersecurity. Existing benchmarks for AI agents in cybersecurity focus mainly on measuring proficiency--how effectively agents can complet...

ExAI5G: A Logic-Based Explainable AI Framework for Intrusion Detection in 5G Networks

Intrusion detection systems IDSs for 5G networks must handle complex, high-volume traffic. Although opaque "black-box" models can achieve high accuracy, their lack of transparency hinders trust and effective operational response. We propose ExAI5G, a framework that prioritizes interpretability by...

OpenClaw PRISM: A Zero-Fork, Defense-In-Depth Runtime Security Layer for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents

Tool-augmented LLM agents introduce security risks that extend beyond user-input filtering, including indirect prompt injection through fetched content, unsafe tool execution, credential leakage, and tampering with local control files. We present OpenClaw PRISM, a zero-fork runtime security layer...

Uncovering Vulnerabilities of LLM-Assisted Cyber Threat Intelligence

Large Language Models LLMs are intensively used to assist security analysts in counteracting the rapid exploitation of cyber threats, wherein LLMs offer cyber threat intelligence CTI to support vulnerability assessment and incident response. While recent work has shown that LLMs can support a wid...

Red Teaming Methodology for Design Obfuscation

The main goal of design obfuscation schemes is to protect sensitive design details from untrusted parties in the VLSI supply chain, including but not limited to off-shore foundries and untrusted end users. In this work, we provide a systematic red teaming approach to evaluate the security of desi...

A Critical Evaluation of Defenses against Prompt Injection Attacks

Large Language Models LLMs are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, and several defenses have recently been proposed, often claiming to mitigate these attacks successfully. However, we argue that existing studies lack a principled approach to evaluating these defenses. In this paper, we argue...