Pre-Characterization of Electromagnetic Side-Channel Leakage Using Publicly Available Information: A Case Study on E-Voting Interfaces

In this work, we study the interface of the Brazilian e-Voting Machine BVM in the context of electromagnetic side-channel threats commonly referred to as TEMPEST attacks. In a TEMPEST attack against video displays, an eavesdropper uses Software-Defined Radios SDRs to recover sensitive information...

Reflecthernet: Exfiltrating 100BASE-TX Ethernet Traffic Using a Retroreflector Hardware Trojan

Electromagnetic eavesdropping is a well-established attack vector for remotely monitoring a target activity, most notably displays, over considerable ranges. Other targets have been considered resistant to such attacks or do not exhibit sufficient electromagnetic leakage for practical exploitatio...

TEMPEST-LoRa: Cross-Technology Covert Communication

Electromagnetic EM covert channels pose significant threats to computer and communications security in air-gapped networks. Previous works exploit EM radiation from various components e.g., video cables, memory buses, CPUs to secretly send sensitive information. These approaches typically require...

Side Channels Are Common

Really interesting research: "Lend Me Your Ear: Passive Remote Physical Side Channels on PCs." Abstract: We show that built-in sensors in commodity PCs, such as microphones, inadvertently capture electromagnetic side-channel leakage from ongoing computation. Moreover, this information is often...