Legacy version check should be removed to avoid double relaying message in CrossDomainMessager.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Legacy version check should be removed to avoid double relaying message Proof of Concept In Optimism bedrock implementation, to handle the pre-bedrock migration, there is code check to make sure the transaction that finalized and relayed in pre-bedrock...

Attacker can steal CrossDomainMessenger and OptimismPortal token balances or tokens of anyone give approval for those contracts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Contracts CrossDomainMessenger and OptimismPortal are part of the bridge protocol and they are responsible for sending messages between two network. they both call arbitrary address with arbitrary data that user specified and it would give attacker to...

Withdrawal with gas limit more than 28_750_517 can never be executed with CrossDomainMessenger

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Withdrawal with gas limit more than 28750517 can never be executed with CrossDomainMessenger. User that will initiate such withdrawal will loose his funds and will not be able to execute the withdrawal, because of reaching maximum block gas limit. Proof ...

CrossDomainMessenger relayMessage Vulnerability

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the sender address sender parameter when relaying a message from Layer 2 L2 to Layer 1 L1 in a cross-domain scenario. The issue arises due to the use of the L2CrossDomainMessenger contract address...

Aliasing L1 sender on L2

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If a contract on L1 has the same address as a contract on L2 but doesn't have the same code, we will have a critical issue, as funds will be lost. Proof of Concept Both Optimism and Arbitrum implements applyL1ToL2Alias / undoL1ToL2Alias logic to prevent ...