approve and safeApprove Should Approve the Zero Amount First

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The PooledCreditLine.sol and LenderPool.sol contracts approve the strategy contract on the collateral or borrow assets before depositing funds. This allows the strategy contracts to transfer on behalf of these contracts, pulling assets out from the pool...

[WP-M7] Wrong design/implementation of interest accrued to the borrowers can make the lenders to end up getting much fewer amount of interest than expected

Lines of code Vulnerability details function calculateInterest uint256 principal, uint256 borrowRate, uint256 timeElapsed internal pure returns uint256 return principal.mulborrowRate.multimeElapsed.divYEARINSECONDS.divSCALINGFACTOR; function updateStateOnPrincipalChangeuint256 id, uint256...

Users at UNSTAKE_PERIOD can assist other users in unstaking tokens.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Consider the following scenario: Day 0: User A stakes 200 tokens and calls the cooldown function. At this time, user A's cooldown is Day 0. Day 15: User B stakes 100 tokens, but then wants to unstake tokens. So user A said that he could assist user B in...

[WP-H3] Proxy admin of the upgradeable proxy contracts can steal _borrowAsset and collateralAsset from the contracts and users' wallet

Lines of code Vulnerability details Both LenderPool and PooledCreditLine are upgradeable contract that holds users' allowances, and in certain periods, LendingPool will be holding users' funds. Use of Upgradeable Proxy Contract Structure allows the logic of the contract to be arbitrarily changed...

DoS: Attacker May Front-Run CoreFactory.createProject() Or CoreFactory.addCollection() With A collection.id Causing Future Transactions With The Same collection.id to Revert

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A collection.id may only be used once in CoreFactory.createCollection since the the contract is deployed using the create2 opcode with a repeated salt and contract bytecode will fail to deploy a contract. Furthermore, the modifier onlyAvailableCollection...

If contract holds balance of any ERC20 token, any user can take it

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If the LiFiDiamond contract ends up holding any ERC20 token, any user is able to perform a swap from the held asset to another asset, and the swap will use the contracts' funds as input instead of their own. The result is that a user can take all of the...

Any user can recover the funds left in the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is a WithdrawFacet such that only the owner/admin can recover the lost funds in the contract. However, any user can retrieve the funds by using the swapTokensGeneric function, which might be unexpected behavior. Proof of Concept 1. Suppose that 100...

Using payable.transfer functions in WithdrawFacet.sol and Libasset.sol is not usable for smart contract calls due to possible shortage of gas.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Withdrawals and transferERC20 tokens are executed via transferERC20 and withdraw functions. Since these functions calls with a fixed amount of gas, it's not yet guaranteed to reach to the destination if the receiver is a smart contract. Proof of Concept...

ALMOST DEPRECATED TRANSFER() IS USED TO WITHDRAW ETHER

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact transfer function can cause withdrawal to fail Proof of Concept function withdraw address assetAddress, address to, uint256 amount public LibDiamond.enforceIsContractOwner; address sendTo = to == address0 ? msg.sender : to; uint256 assetBalance; if...

[WP-H8] Admin of the upgradeable proxy contract (the diamond contract) can rug users

Lines of code Vulnerability details Use of Upgradeable Proxy Contract Structure The Diamond Structure allows the logic of the contract to be arbitrarily changed. This allows the proxy admin to perform malicious actions e.g., taking funds from users' wallets up to the allowance limit. This action...

[WP-H10] GenericSwapFacet.sol#swapTokensGeneric() duplicated .call{ value: msg.value } makes it possible for the attacker to steal native tokens (ETH) from the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details function swapTokensGenericLiFiData memory lifiData, LibSwap.SwapData calldata swapData public payable uint256 receivingAssetIdBalance = LibAsset.getOwnBalancelifiData.receivingAssetId; // Swap executeSwapslifiData, swapData; uint256 postSwapBalance =...

[WP-H6] Swapper can be used to steal all the funds from the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details function swapTokensGenericLiFiData memory lifiData, LibSwap.SwapData calldata swapData public payable uint256 receivingAssetIdBalance = LibAsset.getOwnBalancelifiData.receivingAssetId; // Swap executeSwapslifiData, swapData; uint256 postSwapBalance =...

Should prevent users from sending more native tokens in the startBridgeTokensViaCBridge function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When a user bridges a native token via the startBridgeTokensViaCBridge function of CBridgeFacet, the contract checks whether msg.value = cBridgeData.amount holds. In other words, if a user accidentally sends more native tokens than he has to, the contrac...

All swapping functions lack checks for returned tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Every function that stems from the GenericSwapFacet lacks checks to ensure that some tokens have been returned via the swaps. In LibSwap.sol in the swap function, the swap call is sent to the target DEX. A return of success is required, otherwise the...

[WP-M3] OperateProxy.callFunction() should check if the callee is a contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details /// @notice Allows a sender/signer to make external calls to any other contract. /// @dev A separate OperateProxy contract is used to make the external calls so /// that the Controller, which holds funds and has special privileges in the Quant /// Protocol, is...

Arbitrary code can be run with Controller as msg.sender

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A malicious user can call Controller's operate with ActionType.QTokenPermit, providing a precooked contract address as qToken, that will be called by Controller contract with IQTokenqToken.permit, which implementation can be arbitrary as long as IQToken...

Option create can be denied

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept A griefer can frontrun the createOption from a user and user's tx will revert. This line will revert because of this Recommended Mitigation Steps One gas efficient way to prevent this is to mix msg.sender into salt. --- The text was updated...

[WP-H3] A malicious early user/attacker can manipulate the Collateral contract's pricePerShare to take an unfair share of future users' deposits

Lines of code Vulnerability details function deposituint256 amount external override nonReentrant returns uint256 ... uint256 shares = 0; if totalSupply == 0 shares = amountToDeposit; else / of shares owed = amount deposited / cost per share, cost per share = total supply / total value. / shares ...

DoS attack the system and steal all the users' funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact That exploit is possible because of the implementation of the deposit function of the SingleStrategyController contract. // Assumes approval to take amount has already been given by vault function deposituint256 amount external override onlyVault...

Sending tokens close to the maximum will fail and user will lose tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Proof of Concept When a user calls the deposit function the reward amount is calculated and an event is emited with amount+reward as the transfer amount. The function checks amount is smaller than the m...