Multiple initialization in NoteInterest

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The initialize method of the contract NoteInterest can be initialized multiple times. Proof of Concept The method initialize of the contract NoteInterest looks like this: function initializeaddress cnoteAddr, address oracleAddress external if msg.sender ...

redeemFresh does not work

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The CNote contract uses the CToken contract's redeemFresh function to perform redeem operations. However, since the CNote contract does not hold note tokens, the getCashPrior returns 0 and is less than the redeemAmount, causing the redeemFresh function t...

borrowFresh does not work

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The CNote contract uses the borrowFresh function of the CToken contract to perform the borrow operation. However, since the CNote contract does not hold note tokens, getCashPrior returns 0 and is less than borrowAmount, making the borrowFresh function no...

AccountantDelegate: The sweepInterest function sweeps an incorrect number of cnote.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the sweepInterest function of the AccountantDelegate contract, the number of cnote sent to treasury should be cNoteToSweep instead of amtToSweep, as amtToSweep will normally be smaller than cNoteToSweep, which will cause the interest to be locked in t...

Possible DoS in Staking.claim() function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In Staking contract, users are allowed to stake for another recipient. And it also updates warmUpInfo.expiry for recipient address so recipient can only claim after this new expiry is passed. Attackers can abuse this to constantly stake 1 wei for another...

Potential interests are not distributed fairly among the zcTokens holders, nor taken as a protocol fee, but will be frozen in the redeemer contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details function authRedeem address u, uint256 m, address f, address t, uint256 a public authorizedIMarketPlacemarketPlace.marketsu, m, 0 returns bool // Get the principal token for the given market IERC5095 pt = IERC5095IMarketPlacemarketPlace.marketsu, m, 0; // Make...

It's possible to perform DOS and fund lose in Stacking by transferring tokens directly to contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function rebase in contract Staking calls Yieldy.rebaseprofit, and Yieldy.rebaseprofit, would revert if rebasingCredits / updatedTotalSupply was equal to 0. it's possible to transfer some STAKINGTOKEN directly to Stacking contract before or after...

token transfers in LiquidityReserve and Staking contract don't support deflationary ERC20 tokens, and user funds can be lost if stacking token was deflationary

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact if the token is deflationary then contract will receive less token that requested amount but contract don't check for the real transferred amount. because this is happening in receiving stackingtoken in addLiquidity of LiquidityReserve and stake of Staki...

Wrong parameter passed inside _storeRebase() in Yieldy Contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details In Yieldy contract, while calling storeRebase in function rebase, updatedTotalSupply is passed instead of currentTotalSupply. Filing this as medium risk , due to two impacts, in the way this parameter is used in storeRebase function. 1. The rebasePercent is...

Principal token is not transferred

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When redeeming from APWine and Tempus here, the principal token is not transferred to the redeemer, so may be stuck on the lender contract. Proof of Concept Instead of Safe.transferFromIERC20u, lender, addressthis, amount; it should be...

Centralization Risk On The Withdraw Operation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact During the code review, It has been observed that admin can withdraw all tokens from the system. Proof of Concept 1. Navigate to the following contract : Tools Used Code Review Recommended Mitigation Steps We advise the client to carefully manage the adm...

Illuminate PT redeeming do not return underlying to a user

Lines of code Vulnerability details In the second step of two step redeeming process, the underlying funds should be located in the Redeemer contract as external system burned the shares the Redeemer obtained from the Lender contract and returned underlying to Redeemer. Then Redeemer's Illuminate...

[H-03] Attacker can mint unbound amount of iPTs (on APWine)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Note that I've reported a similar vulnerability, on a different 'Principals' and POC\attack vector is a bit different. I will leave it to the judge to decide if these should be grouped as 1 report or not - but I wanted to be specific at the POC instead of...

Functions in the BatchRequests contract revert for removed contract addresses

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Removing Yieldy contract addresses from the contracts array with BatchRequests.removeAddress replaces the contract address with a zero-address due to how delete works. Each function that loops over the contracts array or accesses an array item by index,...

Transfer the principal token from the lender contract to here but actually transfer underlying token

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Transfer the principal token from the lender contract to here but actually transfer underlying token from lender to redeemer. Proof of Concept // Transfer the principal token from the lender contract to here Safe.transferFromIERC20u, lender, addressthis,...

arbitrage on stake()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Issue: there is a huge arb opportunity for people who deposit 1 block before the rebase Consequences: then they can call instantUnstakeReserve or instantUnstakeCurve to unstake the staked amount, in this way the profit that needs to be distributed on the next...

Uninitialized local variables

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Configuration -Check: uninitialized-local -Severity: Medium -Confidence: Medium -Description:.Lender.approveaddress,uint256,address.i Lender.sol87 is a local variable never initialized.A smart contract with uninitialized local variables may lead to...

if attacker gets admin private key then he can drain all the tokens that Lender.sol contract holds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact if attacker gets admin private key then he can drain all the tokens that Lender.sol contract holds Recommended Mitigation Steps make it harder for admin to do this with some internal sec requirements --- The text was updated successfully, but these error...

Critical address change

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Changing critical addresses in contracts should be a two-step process. in order to prevent changing admin by mistake Proof of Concept check these links: OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts1488 OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts2369 Tools Used Manual...

griefing on claim()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Issue: griefing can happen if coolDownPeriod is 0 due to the fact that you can stake for someone else, whenever a stake happens, the expiry variable increases with coolDownPeriod. This can be done either by watching the mempool and frontrun a stake when someone...