JBPayoutRedemptionPaymentTerminal#processFees may run out of gas and revert due to long list of _heldFeesOf[_projectId]

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept // Get a reference to the project's held fees. JBFee memory heldFees = heldFeesOfprojectId; // Delete the held fees. delete heldFeesOfprojectId; // Push array length in stack uint256 heldFeeLength = heldFees.length; // Process each fee. for...

Upgraded Q -> M from 139 [1656985204675]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 139 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: 1. Buyouts that occur during the timestamp wrap will have valuation errors The blockTimestamp has a modulo applied, so at some point, there will be a timestamp with a value close to 2^32, followed by a timestamp...

[SECURITY] Fedora 36 Update: golang-github-pact-foundation-1.5.1-6.fc36

Pact Go enables consumer driven contract testing, providing a mock service and DSL for the consumer project, and interaction playback and verification for t he service provider project...

PUT short option is always in loss

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact For a long PUT condition the party which is doing short will always be in loss Proof of Concept 1. Alice creates and signs a long put option order off-chain for 2 Bored Ape floors with a duration of 30 days, a strike of 124 WETH and a premium of 0.8 WETH...

onERC721Received() could delegatecall to transder the tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details onERC721Received could delegatecall to transder the tokens Impact Some onERC721Received could use delegatecall to drain the tokens Putty holds. Because the msg.sender is Putty contract, the tarnsfer can go through. Or taking the ownership of the Putty contract...

Eth sent to Timelock will be locked in current implementation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Eth sent to Timelock will be locked in current implementation. I came across this problem while playing around with the governance contract. Proof of Concept Setup the governance contracts GovernorBravoDelegate, Timelock Send eth to timelock contract Set...

accountant and admin cannot be updated at Note.sol once accountant is initialized

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Once state variable accountant is set, accountant and admin will no longer be updated using setAccountantAddress function. Proof of Concept function setAccountantAddressaddress accountant external requiremsg.sender == admin; requireaddressaccountant ==...

Upgraded Q -> M from 18 [1656705908645]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 18 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: Controlled swapRouter The FeeBurner contract sets the swapperRouter in the addressProvider, so the owner can set any type of swapper, paths or pools, even malicious ones. Since there is no slippage defined in the...

Upgraded Q -> M from 18 [1656705895450]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 18 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: Multiple initialization The initialize method of the BkdLocker contract allows it to be started multiple times as long as the value startBoost=0 is set. Abuse these settings to his advantage. Affected source code...

Failed transfer with low level call won't revert

Lines of code Vulnerability details In BaseV1-periphery.sol, the function safeTransferCANTO is as follows: function safeTransferCANTOaddress to, uint value internal bool success, = to.callvalue:valuenew bytes0; requiresuccess, "TransferHelper: ETHTRANSFERFAILED"; This function is utilized in a fe...

AccountantDelegate: The sweepInterest function sweeps an incorrect number of cnote.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the sweepInterest function of the AccountantDelegate contract, the number of cnote sent to treasury should be cNoteToSweep instead of amtToSweep, as amtToSweep will normally be smaller than cNoteToSweep, which will cause the interest to be locked in t...

redeemFresh does not work

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The CNote contract uses the CToken contract's redeemFresh function to perform redeem operations. However, since the CNote contract does not hold note tokens, the getCashPrior returns 0 and is less than the redeemAmount, causing the redeemFresh function t...

Multiple initialization in NoteInterest

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The initialize method of the contract NoteInterest can be initialized multiple times. Proof of Concept The method initialize of the contract NoteInterest looks like this: function initializeaddress cnoteAddr, address oracleAddress external if msg.sender ...

borrowFresh does not work

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The CNote contract uses the borrowFresh function of the CToken contract to perform the borrow operation. However, since the CNote contract does not hold note tokens, getCashPrior returns 0 and is less than borrowAmount, making the borrowFresh function no...

Functions in the BatchRequests contract revert for removed contract addresses

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Removing Yieldy contract addresses from the contracts array with BatchRequests.removeAddress replaces the contract address with a zero-address due to how delete works. Each function that loops over the contracts array or accesses an array item by index,...

Potential interests are not distributed fairly among the zcTokens holders, nor taken as a protocol fee, but will be frozen in the redeemer contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details function authRedeem address u, uint256 m, address f, address t, uint256 a public authorizedIMarketPlacemarketPlace.marketsu, m, 0 returns bool // Get the principal token for the given market IERC5095 pt = IERC5095IMarketPlacemarketPlace.marketsu, m, 0; // Make...

Possible DoS in Staking.claim() function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In Staking contract, users are allowed to stake for another recipient. And it also updates warmUpInfo.expiry for recipient address so recipient can only claim after this new expiry is passed. Attackers can abuse this to constantly stake 1 wei for another...

Principal token is not transferred

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When redeeming from APWine and Tempus here, the principal token is not transferred to the redeemer, so may be stuck on the lender contract. Proof of Concept Instead of Safe.transferFromIERC20u, lender, addressthis, amount; it should be...

It's possible to perform DOS and fund lose in Stacking by transferring tokens directly to contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function rebase in contract Staking calls Yieldy.rebaseprofit, and Yieldy.rebaseprofit, would revert if rebasingCredits / updatedTotalSupply was equal to 0. it's possible to transfer some STAKINGTOKEN directly to Stacking contract before or after...

arbitrage on stake()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Issue: there is a huge arb opportunity for people who deposit 1 block before the rebase Consequences: then they can call instantUnstakeReserve or instantUnstakeCurve to unstake the staked amount, in this way the profit that needs to be distributed on the next...