Wrong usage of positionId in ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager

Handle broccoli Vulnerability details Impact In the subscribe function of ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager, the incentive to subscribed is determined as follows: Incentive memory incentive = incentivespoolpositionId; However, positionId should be incentiveId, a counter that increases by one...

ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager uses wrong index for incentive

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager uses the positionId as an index for incentivespoolpositionId when it should be incentiveId instead: // @audit should be Incentive memory incentive = incentivespoolincentiveId; Incentive memory incentive =...

ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager.sol#reclaimIncentive() Unsafe implementation allows malicious users to steal yield

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details The reclaimIncentive function allows users who added incentives before to withdraw unclaimed rewards. However, the current implementation did not manage the state correctly, incentive.rewardsUnclaimed is not updated after the token transfer, which allows the...

Wrong reward calculation

Handle 0xsanson Vulnerability details Impact In ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager, an user can claimReward of a subscribed position. In order to compute the correct amount, secondsUnclaimed needs to be calculated, but it's implemented incorrectly: uint256 secondsUnclaimed = maxTime -...

Cannot claim reward

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager.claimReward requires stake.initialized but it is never set. It also performs a strange computation as 128 - incentive.secondsClaimed which will almost always underflow and revert the transaction. Impact One cannot claim...

## ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager.sol Wrong implementation of claimReward() and getReward()

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager.sol Wrong implementation of claimReward and getReward Given incentive.secondsClaimed can usually be larger than 128, both claimReward and getReward will revert at: uint256 secondsUnclaimed = maxTime - incentive.startTime --- T...

Users cannot receive rewards from ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager if their liquidity is too large

Handle broccoli Vulnerability details Impact There could be an integer underflow error when the reward of an incentive is claimed, forcing users to wait for a sufficient period or reduce their liquidity to claim the rewards. Proof of Concept The unclaimed reward that a user could claim is...

ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager.sol#claimReward() and reclaimIncentive() will fail when incentive.token is token0 or token1

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details In ConcentratedLiquidityPosition.collect, balances of token0 and token1 in bento will be used to pay the fees. uint256 balance0 = bento.balanceOftoken0, addressthis; uint256 balance1 = bento.balanceOftoken1, addressthis; if balance0 newBalance0 token0amount =...

ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager's incentives can be stolen

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager keeps all tokens for all incentives in the same contract. The reclaimIncentive function does not reduce the incentive.rewardsUnclaimed field and thus one can reclaim tokens several times. This allows anyone to steal all...

Wrong indexes: positionId vs incentiveId

Handle 0xsanson Vulnerability details Impact In multiple functions in ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager, the index positionId is used instead of the correct incentiveId when dealing with the incentives mapping. Of course the issue is that incentives cannot be used, or in some cases only by lucky...

Integer underflow error in claimReward of ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager

Handle broccoli Vulnerability details Impact The claimReward function of ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager calculates the secondsUnclaimed variable using a formula with an unclear intention: uint256 secondsUnclaimed = maxTime - incentive.startTime 128 - incentive.secondsClaimed; This formula cause...

ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager: incorrect calculation of secondsUnclaimed

Handle hickuphh3 Vulnerability details Impact The subtraction of secondsClaimed should be performed after the left shifting of bits in uint256 secondsUnclaimed = maxTime - incentive.startTime 128 - incentive.secondsClaimed; Recommended Mitigation Steps uint256 secondsUnclaimed = maxTime -...

Incentive should check that it hasn't started yet

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager.addIncentive function can add an incentive that already has a non-zero incentive.secondsClaimed. Impact Rewards will be wrong. Recommended Mitigation Steps Add a check: requireincentive.secondsClaimed == 0, "!secondsClaimed...