Repayment/Burn of due tokens is not enforced

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Repayment/burning of due DBR tokens is currently not enforced, which enables a user to simply switch addresses to extend their borrowing duration, which eventually leads to almost 0% interest paid if performed repeatedly, breaking one of the core...

A freshly added collateral token will cause the disadvantage of the borrowing price for the first borrowers.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The Oracle contract is known to be pessimistic in way of serving the lowest prices to prevent borrowers from borrowing more than the lowest recorded value of their collateral over the past 2 days. However, this is not possible for the tokens which are...

Arbitrary user can prevent withdrawals on any users through liquidation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The function liquidate is a public function that handles the repayment of debt and provides a reward for users who call this function. Any user can be liquidated if they have debt outstanding. A user incurs debt if they borrow from the market, based on a...

Using deprecated Chainlink function latestAnswer could result in wrong borrowing power

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The Oracle contract is used to get the latest price for the users collateral tokens, but the functions getPrice and viewPrice use a deprecated Chainlink function latestAnswer to get the price of a given token as it's mentionned here, this function does n...

Attacker can gain more voting power

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can gain more voting power at a low cost Proof of Concept When voting, voting power is taken from the snapshot at the same block as the proposal was created. The attacker can monitor mempool and borrow NFTs just in time when proposal is made...

Sudden price fluctuations occuring at a call to _update() will not be reflected by reserves(), sampleReserves() and sampleSupply() until after periodSize seconds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Consider the situation where a token suddenly drops drastically in price in the market. Consider a call to BaseV1Pair.swap which makes a very large swap between the two tokens accurately reflecting the change in price and also causes a new observation to...

there is no calculation or checks for LTV

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The users decide how much Collateral to send and how many assets to borrow Proof of Concept In the Functions: Borrowing part exactly with borrowAsset and addCollateral there is no calculation or checks for LTV so the users just pass any amount and it wil...

Borrower can pay very little collateral for a huge amount of more valuable asset.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When an approved borrower calls borrowAsset , they are able to borrow as much asset as possible and passing the user controlled collateralAmount input with a lesser value worth of collateral. For example, a user can pay 1 USDC collateral and receive 1000...

Users could borrow all the liquidity in the Pair just by transferring some collateral Token

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any user can borrow any amount of Asset just by transferring some collateral to the Pair Proof of Concept By invoking borrowAsset and passe some of collateralAmount you will be able to borrow all the liquidity in the Pair There is no check for the LTV. i...

maxLTV == 0 shouldn't be solvent but currently always solvent, so borrower can borrow all assets without any collateral.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact maxLTV == 0 shouldn't be solvent but currently always solvent, so borrower can borrow all assets without any collateral since isSolvent always return true. Proof of Concept Assume maxLTV == 0 User call borrowAsset /// @notice The borrowAsset function is...

If maxLTV == 0 case is used for allowing unlimited borrowing without any collateral, borrower whitelist must be enforced.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If maxLTV == 0 case is used for allowing unlimited borrowing without any collateral, borrower whitelist must be enforced since it is a kind of undercollateral. Proof of Concept function isSolventaddress borrower, uint256 exchangeRate internal view return...

Users could borrow all the liquidity in the FraxlendPair

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any user can borrow any amount of Asset without transfer any Collateral Token to the Pair Proof of Concept By invoking borrowAsset and passe collateralAmount = 0 you will be able to borrow all the liquidity in the Pair As we can see they just check for i...

Yield of LiquidityReserve can be stolen

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Using sandwich attacks and JIT Just-in-time liquidity, the yield of LiquidityReserve could be extracted for liquidity providers. Proof of Concept The yield of LiquidityReserve is distributed when a user calls instantUnstakeReserve in Staking. Then, in...

No checks for the input of borrow cap

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact due to lack of input validation of borrowcap , it can be borrowcap for a ctoken can be 0 and value of 0 corresponds to unlimited borrowing Proof of Concept Tools Used manual reveiw Recommended Mitigation Steps add input validation while using it in loop...

CNote updates the accounts after sending the funds, allowing for reentrancy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Having no reentrancy control and updating the records after external interactions allows for funds draining by reentrancy. Setting the severity to medium as this is conditional to transfer flow control introduction on future upgrades, but the impact is up to th...

cause an attacker to get a better deal on intrest rate on borrwoing and lending or cause txs' to revert

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact if the variable maturity in getMaturity function is a big number that gets put into uint40 and since its to big of a number it will revert because solidity ^0.8.0 dosn't allow overflow and on deployment hasMatured can be true because it very close to the...

Undercollateralized loans possible

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The setPoolCollateralFactors function does not check that the collateral factor is 100%. It's possible that it's set to 200% and then borrows more than the collateral is worth, stealing from the pool. Recommended Mitigation Steps Disable the possibility ...

totalFeiBoosted vars can desync in TurboSafe and TurboMaster

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The TurboSafe and TurboMaster contracts each keep track of totalFeiBoosted, getTotalFeiBoostedForVault, and Master keeps track of getTotalBoostedAgainstCollateral in addition. For the TurboMaster contract, these values should be the sum of the...

A malicious user can potentially escape liquidation by creating a dust amount position and trigger the liquidation by themself

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details In the current implementation, a liquidated position can be used for depositing and borrowing again. However, if there is a liquidation auction ongoing, even if the position is now liquidatable, the call of triggerLiquidation will still fail. The liquidator...

Liquidated positions can potential have non-zero debts, making users who deposit to the positions suffer from unfair debt

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details In the current implementation, new borrows will be charged a 0.5% interest right away. Making the borrower be recorded a 100.5% amount of debt. However, when a position got liquidated, the unrealized interest may still remain in the position while the...