Adding balance to accumulator does not depend on the current drawId, while documentation says it does

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In documentation protocol states that : To compute the allocated contribution for a draw d we'd compute the integral of curve cd=−t∗lnα∗α^d from lastdraw dold to dnew, and which is equal to −t∗ α^dold + t∗ α^dnew. Which clearly shows that contribution on...

flashloan stealing staking reward

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The report reveals a vulnerability where a flashloan can be used to steal staking rewards. The provided proof of concept demonstrates the issue, where a user can take advantage of the earned rewards calculation using the spot balance. By flashloaning a...

User can alter amount returned by redeem function due to control transfer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Control is transferred to the receiver when receiving the ERC777. They are able to transfer the ERC777 to another account, at which time the before and after balance calculation will be incorrect. uint256 balanceBefore = IERC20asset.balanceOfreceiver; if...

Yield source does not correctly calculate share conversions

Lines of code Vulnerability details The aTokens’ value is pegged to the value of the corresponding supplied asset at a 1:1 ratio and can be safely stored, transferred or traded. All yield collected by the aTokens' reserves are distributed to aToken holders directly by continuously increasing thei...

BadgerYieldSource balanceOfToken share calculation seems wrong

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details When suppling to the BadgerYieldSource, some amount of badger is deposited to badgerSett and one receives badgerSett share tokens in return which are stored in the balances mapping of the user. So far this is correct. The balanceOfToken function should then...