In case when not all RSR was sold on auction users can loose it

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In case when not all RSR was sold on auction users can loose it, if era was changed for them. Proof of Concept The purpose of StRSR stakers is to provide RSR tokens, that can back system in case if not enough collateral is present. During rebalance,...

RToken.redeem should claim rewards before sending tokens to user

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact RToken.redeem should claim rewards before sending tokens to user. Because after that he will not receive them anymore. Proof of Concept When user mints RToken, then he sends some tokens as collateral and they are stored by BackingManager. Some of...

Incompatibilty of BackingManager with some tokens.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The BackingManager contains a grantRTokenAllowance function which is used to grant token allowances to the RToken contract. function grantRTokenAllowanceIERC20 erc20 external notFrozen requireassetRegistry.isRegisterederc20, "erc20 unregistered"; // ==...

Unspent RSR can be stolen

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The BackingManager.handoutExcessAssets function sends all rsr that the BackingManager holds to the StRSR contract. This is done so that the rsr which is held by the BackingManager due to seizure from the StRSR contract can be sent back entirely to the...

Attacker can cause loss to rToken holders and stakers by running BackingManager._manageTokens before rewards are claimed

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The assets that back the rTokens are held by the BackingManager and can earn rewards. The rewards can be claimed via the TradingP1.claimRewards and TradingP1.claimRewardsSingle function. The BackingManager inherits from TradingP1 and therefore the above...

Fee on transfer based collateral is not considered.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact It has following impacts. 1. backingManager would be transferred with lesser than deposits 2. Recorded liabilities will be more 3. collateral deposited into the RToken contract would be lesser than deposits Proof of Concept Any one can mint RToken by...

redeem() should be possible when protocol is Paused but to be able to redeem function grantRTokenAllowance() should be called for any basket tokens and it can only be called when protocol is not paused

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function redeem in RToken contract, redeems RToken for basket collateral and it's callable when protocol is paused. but function redeem transfers basket tokens from BackingManager contract to redeemer and it requires spending allowance of the BackingMang...

refPerTok() for one asset might revert and break the protocol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact It turns out that function refPerTok might revert for some assets. For example for CTokenFiatCollateral an external call might revert. As a result refPerTok also reverts. Function refPerTok is called in a loop for all assets inside...

Basket range formula is inefficient, leading the protocol to unnecessary haircut

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The BackingManager.manageTokens function checks if there's any deficit in collateral, in case there is, if there's a surplus from another collateral token it trades it to cover the deficit, otherwise it goes for a 'haircut' and cuts the amount of basket...