harvest() can be frontrun, to make the AURABAL token stuck

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the LOCKER contract https://etherscan.io/address/0x3Fa73f1E5d8A792C80F426fc8F84FBF7Ce9bBCACcode anyone can call getreward for any account, therefore an attacker can frontrun an authorized actor, by calling getrewardaddressmyStrategy, before the harves...

auraBAL can be stuck into the Strategy contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The internal harvest function defined is responsible to claim auraBAL from the aura locker and within the function it swaps them to auraBAL - BAL/ETH BPT - WETH - AURA, finally it locks AURA to the locker to increase the position. For claiming auraBAL it...

Missing slippage protection for autocompounding auraBAL rewards into AURA

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Autocompounding auraBAL rewards into AURA requires multiple swaps auraBAL - BAL/ETH BPT - WETH - AURA within MyStrategy.harvest. The swaps are at risk of being front-run / sandwiched, resulting in a loss of funds. Since MEV is very prominent I think the...

Any User May Transfer Rewards From AuraLocker To MyStrategy These Rewards Are Unaccounted For and Stuck

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Harvesting the rewards from AuraLocker incorrectly assumes that rewards are only transferred during harvest when LOCKER.getRewardsaddressthis is called. However it is possible for anyone to call AuraLocker.getRewardsaddressMyStrategy and transfer the...

attacker can lock all the auraBAL rewards in contract address forever and they won't be accessible

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact auraBAL token is in protected tokens list, so it can't be transferred to bribeProcessor by using sweepRewardToken. function harvest is supposed to call LOCKER.getReward and then swap received auraBAL rewards and deposit them in LOCKER, but it only can do...