GHSA-9Q47-3CM2-2RP8 pyLoad: Rate-Limit Bypass and Audit-Log Spoofing via Trusted Client-Controlled `X-Forwarded-For` Header

Summary pyLoad determines the "client IP" used for its rate-limiting decorator and for its security/audit logging by reading the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For XFF HTTP header and taking the leftmost value. No trusted-proxy configuration exists the Cheroot WSGI server faces clients directly, and...

pyLoad: Rate-Limit Bypass and Audit-Log Spoofing via Trusted Client-Controlled `X-Forwarded-For` Header

Summary pyLoad determines the "client IP" used for its rate-limiting decorator and for its security/audit logging by reading the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For XFF HTTP header and taking the leftmost value. No trusted-proxy configuration exists the Cheroot WSGI server faces clients directly, and...

CVE-2026-84439

When audit logging is enabled zookeeper.audit.enable=true, an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper's audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters \t embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value forma...

PT-2026-55845

Summary realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls Details the vuln is in middleware/realip.go , the realIP function pulls IPs straight from client headers and replaces...