Custom redemption might revert if old assets were unregistered

Lines of code Vulnerability details quoteCustomRedemption works under the assumption that the maximum size of the erc20sAll should be assetRegistry.size, however there can be cases where an asset was unregistered but still exists in an old basket, making the size of the old basket greater than...

Loss of precision will lock portions of tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When the initial balance of a redemption reward token is smaller than the base, small amounts of the token will be rounded down to zero, meaning small-amount users will get nothing for redeeming tokens. Broken accounting means high severity Proof of...

Some fund could be locked in the project forever because only contributors but not project token holders can redeem

Lines of code Vulnerability details Some fund could be locked in the project forever because only contributors but not project token holders can redeem Impact Once the contributor transfered the project tokens to someone elsein some DEX maybe, these tokens could never be redeemed. One of the...

[WP-H1] A malicious early user/attacker can manipulate the vault's pricePerShare to take an unfair share of future users' deposits

Lines of code Vulnerability details This is a well-known attack vector for new contracts that utilize pricePerShare for accounting. / @notice Calculates the number of shares that should be minted or burnt when a user deposit or withdraw. @param tokens Amount of asset tokens @return Number of...

An attacker can make users' funds get "locked" in the contract (the owner can get them out and transfer them back to the users)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If a user manages to be the first user to deposit into the contract, he will be minted shares and he can steal all the other users' deposits. Proof of Concept 1. The attacker deposits 1 token into the contract and 1 share is minted to him totalSupply and...

getPseudoRand can be predicted

Handle @cmichelio Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details The NFTXVaultUpgradeable.getPseudoRand is not really random and can be predicted. It's also easy to make sure that one gets the correct token by having a smart contract simulate the randomness logic before the call to redeem / swap...