zte-smartlife-app-pwned

Suites de Prueba de Concepto PoC Este directorio contiene las herramientas PoC mínimas y autónomas utilizadas para validar las vulnerabilidades del backend de ZTE SmartLife CVE-2026-86552, CVE-2026-86553, CVE-2026-86554, CVE-2026-86555. Todos los endpoints han sido parcheados y el material de...

zte-smartlife-app-pwned

ZTE SmartLife Security Findings Leading to Account Takeover T...

CVE-2026-86555

The ZTE SmartLife application has a hardcoded key. The key used to decrypt account server information is stored in plaintext in the code. Once the key is obtained, the server information can be decrypted, thus exposing it...

CVE-2026-86555

The ZTE SmartLife mobile application contains a hardcoded key used to decrypt account server information. The key is stored in plaintext within the application code, so an attacker with access to the binary can extract it and decrypt the protected server configuration data. The CVSS v3.1 score is...

CVE-2026-86555 Hardcoded Key Vulnerability in ZTE SmartLife APP

The ZTE SmartLife application has a hardcoded key. The key used to decrypt account server information is stored in plaintext in the code. Once the key is obtained, the server information can be decrypted, thus exposing it...

CVE-2026-86555 Hardcoded Key Vulnerability in ZTE SmartLife APP

The ZTE SmartLife application has a hardcoded key. The key used to decrypt account server information is stored in plaintext in the code. Once the key is obtained, the server information can be decrypted, thus exposing it...

EUVD-2026-83717

The ZTE SmartLife application has a hardcoded key. The key used to decrypt account server information is stored in plaintext in the code. Once the key is obtained, the server information can be decrypted, thus exposing it...

CVE-2026-86554

SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters within its runtime process. With the obtained SmartLife application authentication parameters, attackers can directly invoke the backend interface /account/verify.serv to determine whether a target email...

CVE-2026-86554 Email enumeration and account ID leakage vulnerabilities in ZTE SmartLife APP

SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters within its runtime process. With the obtained SmartLife application authentication parameters, attackers can directly invoke the backend interface /account/verify.serv to determine whether a target email...

CVE-2026-86554 Email enumeration and account ID leakage vulnerabilities in ZTE SmartLife APP

SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters within its runtime process. With the obtained SmartLife application authentication parameters, attackers can directly invoke the backend interface /account/verify.serv to determine whether a target email...

EUVD-2026-83712

SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters within its runtime process. With the obtained SmartLife application authentication parameters, attackers can directly invoke the backend interface /account/verify.serv to determine whether a target email...

CVE-2026-86554

ZTE SmartLife APP is affected by an email enumeration and account ID leakage vulnerability. The app dynamically generates authentication parameters in its runtime process, which an attacker with low privileges can extract and use to invoke the backend endpoint /account/verify.serv . This allows a...

CVE-2026-86553

SmartLife app dynamically generates fresh SmartLife application authentication parameters inside its runtime process. Using the acquired SmartLife application authentication parameters, an attacker can directly call the backend interface /account/verify.serv to obtain the real account ID...

CVE-2026-86552

SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters at runtime. With the acquired SmartLife application authentication credentials, an attacker can directly complete registration using any arbitrary email address via the backend interface...

CVE-2026-86553 A password reset vulnerability in ZTE SmartLife APP

SmartLife app dynamically generates fresh SmartLife application authentication parameters inside its runtime process. Using the acquired SmartLife application authentication parameters, an attacker can directly call the backend interface /account/verify.serv to obtain the real account ID...

CVE-2026-86553 A password reset vulnerability in ZTE SmartLife APP

SmartLife app dynamically generates fresh SmartLife application authentication parameters inside its runtime process. Using the acquired SmartLife application authentication parameters, an attacker can directly call the backend interface /account/verify.serv to obtain the real account ID...

EUVD-2026-83649

SmartLife app dynamically generates fresh SmartLife application authentication parameters inside its runtime process. Using the acquired SmartLife application authentication parameters, an attacker can directly call the backend interface /account/verify.serv to obtain the real account ID...

CVE-2026-86553

CVE-2026-86553 is a password reset vulnerability in the ZTE SmartLife mobile application. The root cause lies in how the app dynamically generates fresh authentication parameters within its runtime process. An attacker who acquires these parameters can directly call the backend endpoint /account/...

CVE-2026-86552 A vulnerability that skips email ownership verification for account registration in ZTE SmartLife APP

SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters at runtime. With the acquired SmartLife application authentication credentials, an attacker can directly complete registration using any arbitrary email address via the backend interface...

EUVD-2026-83648

SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters at runtime. With the acquired SmartLife application authentication credentials, an attacker can directly complete registration using any arbitrary email address via the backend interface...