EUVD-2026-57274

Apache Airflow's Task SDK rebuilt a Callback object from serialized data by re-running its constructor, which imports the module named by the stored callback path. Because SyncCallback is itself an Airflow class it passes the default alloweddeserializationclasses allow-list, so tightening that...

CVE-2026-67587 Apache Airflow: DAG-author remote code execution on the Scheduler via a Serde `Callback` deserialization gadget

Apache Airflow's Task SDK rebuilt a Callback object from serialized data by re-running its constructor, which imports the module named by the stored callback path. Because SyncCallback is itself an Airflow class it passes the default alloweddeserializationclasses allow-list, so tightening that...

PT-2026-71126

Apache Airflow's Task SDK rebuilt a Callback object from serialized data by re-running its constructor, which imports the module named by the stored callback path. Because SyncCallback is itself an Airflow class it passes the default allowed deserialization classes allow-list, so tightening that...

PYSEC-0000-CVE-2026-45360

Apache Airflow's scheduler-side deadline-reference decoder SerializedCustomReference.deserializereference imported and dispatched arbitrary class paths drawn from DAG-author-controlled serialized state without an allowlist or plugin-registry gate. A DAG author whose code reaches the scheduler — t...

CVE-2026-45360

Summary (CVE-2026-45360) : Apache Airflow’s scheduler-side deadline-reference deserialization in SerializedCustomReference.deserialize_reference can import arbitrary attacker-controlled module paths because there is no allowlist or plugin-registry gate. A DAG author’s code that reaches the schedu...