CVE-2025-32057

The Infotainment ECU manufactured by Bosch which is installed in Nissan Leaf ZE1 – 2020 uses a Redbend service for over-the-air provisioning and updates. HTTPS is used for communication with the back-end server. Due to usage of the default configuration for the underlying SSL engine, the server...

CVE-2025-32057

The Infotainment ECU manufactured by Bosch which is installed in Nissan Leaf ZE1 – 2020 uses a Redbend service for over-the-air provisioning and updates. HTTPS is used for communication with the back-end server. Due to usage of the default configuration for the underlying SSL engine, the server...

CVE-2025-32057

The CVE-2025-32057 entry concerns the Bosch Infotainment ECU in Nissan Leaf ZE1 (2020). The vulnerability arises from using a Redbend OTA service with HTTPS where the SSL engine uses a default configuration, resulting in server root certificate verification being disabled. This can allow an attac...

CVE-2025-32057 Misconfigured SSL/TLS communication of Redbend service for Infotainment ECU

The Infotainment ECU manufactured by Bosch which is installed in Nissan Leaf ZE1 – 2020 uses a Redbend service for over-the-air provisioning and updates. HTTPS is used for communication with the back-end server. Due to usage of the default configuration for the underlying SSL engine, the server...

CVE-2025-32057

The Infotainment ECU manufactured by Bosch which is installed in Nissan Leaf ZE1 – 2020 uses a Redbend service for over-the-air provisioning and updates. HTTPS is used for communication with the back-end server. Due to usage of the default configuration for the underlying SSL engine, the server...

CVE-2025-32057 Misconfigured SSL/TLS communication of Redbend service for Infotainment ECU

The Infotainment ECU manufactured by Bosch which is installed in Nissan Leaf ZE1 – 2020 uses a Redbend service for over-the-air provisioning and updates. HTTPS is used for communication with the back-end server. Due to usage of the default configuration for the underlying SSL engine, the server...

Reverse Engineering the Tesla Firmware Update Process

TL;DR How does the Tesla Model S update its firmware? What did we find when reverse engineering the display and instrument cluster? Here’s the result of a couple of weeks work, working on a real vehicle that mostly worked after we had finished. Part 1: analysing the hardware, complete with a 14...

Mobile Carrier Controls Exploitable on a Massive Scale

LAS VEGAS – Device manufacturers and service providers quietly maintain a pervasive level of remote control over the devices they sell to consumers so they can push over-the-air OTA updates for a variety of reasons, but problematically one popular product that enables this type of control is poor...